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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis has the goal of finding the proper place of religious reasons in a pluralistic liberal 
democracy in the debate between two liberal political philosophers, John Rawls and Nicholas 
Wolterstorff. According to Rawls, who is concerned with the legitimacy of binding laws in a 
liberal democratic society and the stability of such a society without oppressing citizens, free and 
equal citizens naturally and inevitably disagree on their moral, philosophical, and religious 
comprehensive doctrines. Thus, we should look for social unity in a shared political basis, which 
is independent from all these doctrines. Binding laws are legitimate if they can be supported by 
public reasons drawn from this political basis. Therefore, citizens have the moral duty to use 
public reasons, and avoid using religious reasons and other nonpublic reasons, to justify binding 
laws. Wolterstorff, however, is skeptical of the existence of such a shared political basis and 
worries that the restraint on using religious reasons puts an unfair and unnecessary burden on 
religious citizens who may have all their beliefs shaped by their religion. Thus, he argues that 
liberalism entails that citizens should be free to use whatever reasons they have in support of 
binding laws. In this work, I will explain Rawls’s views (the exclusive, inclusive, and wide 
views) and Wolterstorff’s views (the consocial position and the equal political voice view) as 
well as examine strengths and weaknesses in their arguments. Then, I will argue that Rawls’s 
wide view, according to which citizens are free to use religious reason in public political 
deliberations with the proviso of supplementing it with proper public reason in due course, is the 
best among these views to create a balance between the neutrality of the state, and thus social 
peace and stability, in a pluralistic democratic society, on the one hand, and freedom to exercise 
one’s religion and freedom of speech, on the other. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Should there be any restraints on the reasons citizens use when participating in political 
decision-making about binding laws or policies in a pluralistic democratic society? This question 
is the starting point of this thesis. My focus here, however, will be specifically on the place of 
religious reasons in the public political domain of a pluralistic democracy in the eyes of John 
Rawls and his critic Nicholas Wolterstorff. This debate is relevant to contemporary pluralistic 
constitutional democracies, like Canada and the United States. In such societies, it still seems a 
hard task to find a balance between, on the one hand, not letting religion determine laws and 
policies, which can result in the violation of the neutrality of the state as well as silencing and 
excluding nonreligious citizens, and on the other hand, not silencing and excluding religious 
citizens from political participation. A current example of the former concern can be seen in the 
United States, where some officials cite the Bible to justify their policy of separating the children 
of (illegal) immigrants from their parents.
1
 By doing this, they label criticisms of this policy as 
not-worth-listening-to statements that are against what they consider to be the “will of God.” 
This way, they can stigmatize those criticisms and thus block them from being heard, which is 
not in accordance with the spirit of a pluralistic liberal democracy. However, Wolterstorff rightly 
worries that public reason liberalism might portray religion as inherently dangerous or as 
irrelevant and unworthy. If this happens, liberalism itself will be threatened because the equality 
condition of liberalism might be violated; religious citizens, who choose to support their political 
beliefs with religious reasons, might lose their equal status and their equal right to express their 
                                                          
1
 Adam Edelman, “Sessions cites Bible in defense of breaking up families, blames migrant parents,” NBC 
News, last modified June 16, 2018. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/sessions-cites-bible-
defense-breaking-families-blames-migrant-parents-n883296 
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thoughts while being listened to and respected. This can lead to the alienation of religious 
citizens and thus their gradual exclusion them from public political deliberation, which is again 
against the spirit of a pluralistic liberal democracy. An example of this concern can be the 
current situation in the United States, in which Donald Trump is seen as a “dream president” 
who can bring “religious freedom.”2 This situation can be understood as a backlash against the 
perceived exclusion of religious citizens from politics by liberal elites. 
In the Rawls-Wolterstorff debate, Rawls argues for some kind of restraint on religious 
reasons while Wolterstorff disagrees, arguing that there should be no such restraint. Rawls 
believes that in a pluralistic democratic society where citizens hold conflicting worldviews, they 
have a moral duty to use generally understandable and acceptable reasons, namely, public 
reasons, to explain why they are supporting a certain binding law about fundamental political 
issues. Wolterstorff, however, argues that looking for public reason is not only unrealistic, but if 
all citizens have an equal voice and treat each other well and justly, they can offer any kind of 
reason they want, including religious reasons. While I am sympathetic to Wolterstorff’s idea that 
citizens’ freedom should not be restricted by excluding nonpublic reasons (like religious reasons) 
from public political discussions, I will argue in favour of Rawls’s latest view regarding his 
public reason restraint, which he calls the wide view of public political culture. According to this 
view, it is not sufficient to use only nonpublic reasons, like religious reasons, to justify a binding 
law in a pluralistic democracy; proper public reasons should be introduced in due course in 
support of the same law to make it legitimate. I will also argue that Wolterstorff’s arguments in 
favour of a no-restraint position on religious reasons and against Rawls’s public reason 
liberalism are flawed and lack precision. 
                                                          
2
 Jonathan Wilson-Hartgrove, “Why Evangelicals Support President Trump, Despite His Immorality,” 
TIME, last modified Feb 16, 2018. http://time.com/5161349/president-trump-white-evangelical-support-
slaveholders/ 
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In 1993, Rawls first developed his theory of public reason in the book Political 
Liberalism as a result of his realization of what he calls the fact of reasonable pluralism. 
According to this fact, we should never expect free and equal citizens to agree on the same 
worldview—or as Rawls calls it, a moral, philosophical, or religious comprehensive doctrine—in 
a free democratic society. In other words, disagreement on reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
is a reasonable disagreement; the natural and unavoidable result of freedom and equality. As a 
result of the irreconcilability of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, Rawls argues that we 
should look for social unity somewhere else, namely, in a shared political basis which is 
freestanding or independent of all comprehensive doctrines. The subject matter of this shared 
political basis, or a family of political conceptions of justice, is fundamental political issues, 
which are “the constitutional essentials and the basic questions of justice.”3 
The freestanding shared political basis is Rawls’s solution to his main concerns regarding 
a pluralistic democratic society: public justification of binding laws and the long-term stability of 
such a society. These two concerns are usually referred to as the legitimacy challenge and the 
stability challenge.
4
 For Rawls, a binding law can be justified if it can be supported by public 
reasons, which are drawn from political conceptions of justice. Therefore, using only religious 
reasons, like appealing to the Torah, Bible, or Quran, which are nonpublic, cannot help to justify 
a law that applies to all citizens with diverse comprehensive views. In his response to the 
stability challenge, Rawls argues that a pluralistic society would be stable for a long time if its 
citizens, despite holding different, incompatible comprehensive views, could find an overlapping 
consensus on a family of political conceptions of justice. Based on the extent to which a society 
has achieved an overlapping consensus, that is, the extent to which a society is well-ordered, 
                                                          
3
 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 156.  
4
 Leif Wenar, “John Rawls,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, last modified Jan 9, 2017. 
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Rawls explains how public justification of binding laws or the ideal of public reason can be 
achieved. In other words, there seems to be a link between the two challenges for Rawls: the 
legitimacy challenge is resolved differently in societies with different degrees of stability. 
Rawls introduces three kinds of societies: well-ordered, partially well-ordered, and non-
well-ordered.
5
 In the first kind of society, which is the ideal, there is a strong overlapping 
consensus between different reasonable comprehensive doctrines on a family of political 
conceptions of justice. Such a society is just, and basic liberties and rights are respected in it. In 
this ideal society, Rawls argues that, in order to justify binding laws, citizens have the moral duty 
to always support those laws by using public reason. This is Rawls's exclusive view. In the case 
of the second and third kinds of societies, however, Rawls introduces the inclusive view of 
public reason. According to this view, binding laws can be publicly justified not necessarily by 
offering public reasons, but by presenting the political values inherent in one's reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine with the proviso that it leads to strengthening the ideal of public reason 
and moving the society towards becoming well-ordered. Rawls's examples of strengthening the 
ideal of public reason in a non-well-ordered society are Martin Luther King and the abolitionists 
who used religious reasons in a way that led their society to get closer to political justice. 
Rawls revised his idea of public reason in 1997, and introduced the wide view of public 
political culture.
6
 This view allows citizens to offer religious reasons, or other kinds of nonpublic 
reasons, in public political decision-making in support of a binding law, but with the proviso that 
those reasons be supplemented by proper public reasons in due course.  The interesting point 
about this view is that Rawls leaves the time that the proviso should be satisfied and the person 
                                                          
5
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 248-252. 
6
 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” University of Chicago Law Review 64, no. 3 
(1997): 783-787. 
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who should satisfy the proviso unspecified, because he believes that these are practical issues 
which should be decided at their time.  
Wolterstorff objects to all of Rawls’s views with the same criticism. He argues that the 
hope of achieving a freestanding shared political basis is misguided, which makes public reason 
misguided too. Although, like Rawls, Wolterstorff accepts the reasonable pluralism of 
comprehensive doctrines, he argues that we cannot hope to reach consensus on political 
conceptions. He also believes that the idea of public reason, and excluding religious reasons from 
public political deliberations, is incompatible with citizens’ freedom to exercise their religion as 
they see fit, and as a result it is incompatible with the “Idea of liberal democracy,” which for 
Wolterstorff embodies “equal protection, equal freedom, equal voice, and state neutrality.”7 
Moreover, in a famous objection to the Rawlsian idea of public reason, which is usually called 
the integrity objection,
8
 Wolterstorff argues that for many religious citizens, religion is what 
shapes their values, beliefs, and ethics. As a result, to expect these people to offer public reason 
rather than religious reasons, which they really believe, is to violate their integrity. In a later 
version of this objection, Wolterstorff argues that the fact that such religious citizens exist in 
society shows that the Rawlsian moral duty which encourages citizens to use public reason, or 
supplement their religious reasons with public ones, is not the ethic of the citizen that we should 
accept in a liberal democracy. 
                                                          
7
 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues,” in Robert 
Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in the public square: The place of religious convictions in 
political debate.  (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1977), 71. According to 
Wolterstorff, the core ideas of liberal democracy are “Equal protection under law for all people, equal 
freedom in law for all citizens, and neutrality on the part of the state with respect to the diversity of 
religions and comprehensive perspectives.” Wolterstorff, “Role of Religion,” 70. 
8
 Wolterstorff’s version of the integrity objection is provided in the book Religion in the Public Square : 
The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate is mentioned by Kevin Vallier as a “a classic 
statement of the integrity objection.” “Liberalism, Religion and Integrity,” Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 90, no.1 (2012): 156. Also see Kevin Vallier, “Public Justification,” Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, last modified March 1, 2018. 
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Wolterstorff believes that his own accounts of liberal democracy are the ones that are 
compatible with what he calls the Idea of liberal democracy. His consocial position, which is 
explained in his 1997 piece in Religion in the Public Square, rejects the restraint of Rawls’s 
account of religious reasons and instead introduces three new kinds of restraints: the manner 
restraint, according to which citizens should respect each other by listening to each other open-
mindedly; the constitution restraint, according to which political discussions should not violate 
the constitution; and the justice restraint, according to which political discussions should have 
the goal of achieving political justice rather than gaining self-interest. Wolterstorff’s second 
account of liberal democracy, the equal political voice view, is explained in some articles in his 
book Understanding Liberal Democracy: Essays in Political Philosophy in 2012. In this account 
of liberal democracy, he seems to repeat the same restraints from the consocial position, but with 
different language. He argues that citizens can offer any kind of reason they want in public 
political deliberations in support of a law, with the condition that they do not bully each other. 
Since he thinks it is not realistic to expect to reach a consensus on a binding law, the political 
decision is normally made by voting. Citizens should learn to accept the result of the vote, as 
long as it does not violate the constitution, in which case the result of the vote would be out of 
order. Therefore, it seems it is the voting procedure that, for Wolterstorff, justifies binding laws. 
My main argument in this thesis is that the reasons used to support binding laws are 
important in justifying those laws. Wolterstorff tries to show otherwise, but he is not successful 
as he cannot remain consistent in his view against the restraint on religious reasons. For example, 
in his 2013 article, “Reply to Kevin Carnahan and Erik A. Anderson,” Wolterstorff calls a 
Christian citizen’s religious reason that appeals to God out of order while accepting another 
reason in support of the same law. This is contradictory because nowhere in his positive account 
7 
 
has Wolterstorff called a reason out of order; rather, he calls laws (the results of voting) that 
violate the constitution as out of order. There are also other inconsistencies in Wolterstorff’s 
arguments as well as imprecisions in presenting Rawls’s views, which I will explain in detail in 
the third chapter. Therefore, while Wolterstorff’s view might look more liberal than the public 
reason view, I will show that it is ironically caught in the trap of idealism, which he criticizes 
Rawls for. This is because Wolterstorff does not deal with important practical details of his 
view—which makes his view look “simplistic,” as William Curtis puts it9—and is not consistent 
in some of his important arguments against the idea of public reason. I will, therefore, end my 
thesis by arguing that although Rawls’s views are also idealistic in the sense that they give an 
ideal definition of citizen and society, his wide view of public political culture is the most 
successful, among all the views discussed here, in creating a balance between the neutrality of 
state towards the plurality of religious and nonreligious comprehensive views, on the one hand, 
and the freedom of religion (and also secular doctrines) and freedom of expression, on the other 
hand, in a reasonable pluralistic democracy. 
The second chapter, which is of an exegetical nature, examines Rawls’s idea of public 
reason in his political liberalism philosophy. After describing Rawls’s methodology and ideal 
concepts of persons and society, I will explain the legitimacy and stability challenges as well as 
the distinction Rawls draws between comprehensive doctrines and political conceptions, due to 
his realization of the fact of reasonable pluralism. Then I will summarize the idea of public 
reason, explaining that its content is drawn from political conceptions of justice, its subject 
matter is fundamental political issues, and its application is in the public political culture (or the 
public political forum), consisting of judges, government officials, and candidates for public 
                                                          
9
 William M. Curtis, Defending Rorty: Pragmatism and Liberal Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 226. 
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office. The idea of public reason can also apply to citizens when they vote or actively advocate a 
fundamental political issue. However, in his revised version of the idea of public reason, Rawls 
points out that public reason applies to citizens less strictly, and their moral duty is to “think of 
themselves ideally as if they were legislators following public reason,”10 and by doing this hold 
the officials and legislators accountable.  Finally, I will examine the place of religious reasons in 
the ideal of public reason by explaining the exclusive and inclusive views. 
The third chapter starts by introducing Wolterstorff’s accounts of liberal democracy, 
which are the consocial position and the equal political voice view. Then I will lay out his main 
criticism of Rawls’s idea of public reason based on the claim that it is impractical due to the 
infeasibility of having freestanding shared political basis. I will then argue against Wolterstorff’s 
criticisms of public reason, showing the contradictions and flaws of his arguments by drawing on 
the work of philosophers like Robert Audi, Erik Anderson, and William Curtis, as well as 
address Wolterstorff’s article “Reply to Kevin Carnahan and Erik A. Anderson.” I will also 
examine his integrity objection and respond to it by arguing that complete integrity is impossible 
and that this objection contradicts another argument of his against public reason, which I call the 
many reasons argument. In this argument, Wolterstorff defends using as many reasons as 
possible in support of the same law when deliberating with different people, for the reason that 
we actually need to use different reasons to convince different people who hold different views 
in order to support the law in question. I will end the thesis with the fourth chapter by stating the 
conclusions reached throughout the third chapter regarding the inconsistencies in Wolterstorff’s 
arguments, and will argue that Rawls’s wide view is the most compatible view with the Idea of 
liberal democracy among all the views discussed in this work.  
                                                          
10
 Rawls, “Public Reason Revisited,” 770. (emphasis added)  
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Chapter 2: Rawls’s Idea of Public Reason 
 
According to Rawls, in a pluralistic society, where people have different, incompatible 
religious or nonreligious worldviews, the only way to be able to live together in peace as free and 
equal citizens is to endorse a reasonable constitutional democracy,
11
 or political liberalism. In 
such a society, for political decision making, citizens should have the opportunity to deliberate 
and discuss public political issues by exchanging their reasons to support their ideas. To justify a 
binding law that will affect everybody, however, it is a moral duty of citizens not to appeal to 
nonpublic reasons, which are reasons based on their religious, moral, or philosophical 
conceptions of the good life, or as Rawls call them, comprehensive doctrines. This is because 
most reasonable citizens do not share the same comprehensive doctrine. It is incompatible with a 
pluralistic liberal democratic society—in which all citizens are considered free and equal and the 
plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines is a natural outcome of a free society—to let a 
group of citizens establish hegemony based on their shared comprehensive doctrine, that is to 
say, to impose the rules and ideas of their comprehensive doctrine on others. This, for Rawls, 
“would be inconsistent with the idea of equal basic liberties for all free and equal citizens.”12  
By accepting the fact of reasonable pluralism, in his version of liberal democracy, Rawls 
recognizes two challenges: the legitimacy challenge and the stability challenge. The first one is 
the challenge of justifying our political decisions about laws that are binding for all. In other 
words, he poses the question of how we can expect citizens with diverse comprehensive 
doctrines to accept and abide by the same laws without violating their equality and freedom. His 
solution is that citizens have the duty to base their decisions on the political values that they all 
                                                          
11
 Rawls understands “a well ordered constitutional democracy … as a deliberative democracy.” Rawls, 
“Public Reason Revisited,” 772. 
12
 Rawls, “Public Reason Revisited,” 782. 
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share regardless of their comprehensive doctrines. The stability challenge asks how people with 
diverse and incompatible comprehensive doctrines can live together justly and stably for a long 
time. He answers this question by introducing the idea of an overlapping consensus of 
comprehensive doctrines on a family of political conceptions of justice. Both of these challenges 
are connected to the idea of public reason that is explored in this chapter. The legitimacy 
challenge shows the need for public reason to justify binding laws in pluralistic liberal 
democracies, whereas the stability challenge shows the need for a common political basis 
between all reasonable comprehensive doctrines that can formulate public reason. 
In this chapter my goal is to explore John Rawls's idea of public reason as it is introduced 
in his second book, Political Liberalism, in which he distinguishes political conceptions from 
religious, moral, and philosophical comprehensive doctrines. In order to clarify what Rawls 
means by public reason, I will show how important Rawlsian concepts, like comprehensive 
doctrines, political conceptions of justice, and overlapping consensus, are connected to each 
other and to the idea of public reason in Rawls’s well-ordered society. 
In section 2.1 I will explain some of Rawls’s basic assumptions that I find necessary for 
understanding his philosophy of political liberalism, within which he develops the idea of public 
reason. In section 2.2, I will explore Rawls’s intention for introducing the idea of public reason 
by discussing the fact of reasonable pluralism, the distinction between comprehensive doctrines 
and political conceptions, the legitimacy challenge, and the concept of reasonableness. The 
content, scope, and subject of public reason will be examined in section 2.3, as well as the 
challenge of stability and the idea of an overlapping consensus. Finally, in section 2.4, the 
implications of Rawls’s idea of public reason for religious reasons (as a sort of nonpublic reason) 
and their role in political decision making in ideal and nonideal societies will be discussed.     
11 
 
2.1: Starting assumptions  
Before presenting Rawls’s attempts to justify the legitimacy of binding laws on citizens 
in a democratic society by introducing his idea of public reason, it is helpful to briefly clarify 
some of his assumptions. Rawls formulates his democratic theory based on specific and idealized 
definitions of society and the person. He defines the idea of society as “a fair system of 
cooperation over generations.”13 Such a society is closed and self-sufficient, which means that it 
is where citizens can live fulfilling lives as free and equal, from their birth to their death.
14
 Since 
Rawls’s political liberalism deals with the political domain, he defines persons politically as 
citizens who are free and equal. Being also reasonable and rational, citizens have two moral 
powers, namely a “capacity for a sense of justice” and a “capacity for a conception of the 
good.”15 These two capacities make it possible for citizens to be “fully cooperating member[s] of 
society over a complete life.”16 Rawls also adds to these two fundamental ideas the idea of a 
well-ordered society, which is introduced “as a society effectively regulated by a political 
conception of justice.”17 In such an ideal society, all citizens endorse the principles of justice 
with the knowledge that others would do the same. I will further explain these ideas in more 
details in the following sections. 
Rawls consciously uses such ideal conceptions as these because he thinks that we first 
need to construct an ideal theory and then use it as a guide for a nonideal theory that can help us 
deal with real world problems like “existing injustices.”18 Also, an ideal theory can give us some 
standards based on which we can recognize what needs to be fixed and in what order; thus it 
                                                          
13
Rawls, Political Liberalism, 35. 
14
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 12. 
15
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 19.  
16
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 18. 
17
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 14. 
18
 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2001), 13. 
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gives us a vision of how to improve our nonideal world.
19
 In other words, according to Rawls, 
there cannot be a nonideal theory without having an ideal theory first. Rawls not only does not 
consider such an idealization to be unrealistic, he believes that thinking of it as unrealistic can 
negatively affect our view of the world and our attitudes towards it, which underlie the way we 
conduct politics.  He asks whether it is “worthwhile for human beings to live on the earth”20 if 
they do not see themselves, at least to some extent, as having the two mentioned moral capacities 
that can lead them to care for justice.  
Although Rawls’s methodology of using ideal conceptions and constructing an ideal 
theory is controversial and can be criticized in different ways,
21
 given the limited space that I 
have here, it is not my intention to focus on this methodology or criticisms against it. However, I 
need to mention that the ideal nature of Rawls’s political liberalism does not result in him 
overlooking the nonideal conditions of a pluralistic democratic society (like Canada or the 
United States) in his theory.
22
 To be more specific, when theorizing about the limits of public 
                                                          
19
 In the book, Justice as Fairness: A restatement, Rawls says: “the idea of a well-ordered society should 
also provide some guidance in thinking about nonideal theory, and so about difficult cases of how to deal 
with existing injustices. It should also help to clarify the goal of reform and to identify which wrongs are 
more grievous and hence more urgent to correct.” 13; Also in Political Liberalism he says, “we always 
work at first within ideal theory.” 55; He also says, “ideal theory, which defines a perfectly just basic 
structure, is a necessary complement to nonideal theory without which the desire for change lacks an 
aim.” Id. at 285.  
20
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, lx. Also see: “The answer we give to the question of whether a just 
democratic society is possible and can be stable for the right reasons affects our background thoughts and 
attitudes about the world as a whole. And it affects these thoughts and attitudes before we come to actual 
politics, and limits or inspires how we take part in it. Debates about general philosophical questions 
cannot be the daily stuff of politics, but that does not make these questions without significance, since 
what we think their answers are will shape the underlying attitudes of the public culture and the conduct 
of politics. If we take for granted as common knowledge that a just and well-ordered democratic society is 
impossible, then the quality and tone of those attitudes will reflect that knowledge.” Id. at lix. 
21
 See, for example, Charles W. Mills, “'Ideal Theory' as Ideology,” Hypatia 20, no. 3 (2005): 165-84; 
and, Colin Farrelly, “Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation,” Political Studies 55 (2007): 844-64. 
22
 In Political Liberalism, Rawls discusses some of the present political debates in the U.S. like abortion 
(p. 246), funding religious schools (p. 248), and school prayer (p. li). Although Rawls tries not to take a 
final position on such issues, he introduces a theoretical framework (i.e. political liberalism) that citizens 
can use to deliberate and make decision on them in a constitutional democratic society. 
13 
 
reason, Rawls talks about three kinds of societies among which only the first one is the perfect, 
well-ordered society in which all citizens completely agree on a political conception of justice. 
The other two kinds of societies—namely, a well-ordered society in which there is disagreement 
on a political conception of justice, and a non-well-ordered society in which there are a large 
number of disputes and disagreements about fundamental political issues—are similar to real 
societies. Rawls ties the limits of applying public reason to the historical and social conditions of 
society, asserting that it is only in the first kind of society that citizens (officials and legislators 
who are exercising powers of public office and candidates for public office, or citizens who vote 
on a fundamental political issue) have the moral duty to always use public reason in their debates 
about fundamental political issues. In other words, he recognizes that, in real situations, the ideal 
of public reason can also be fulfilled by using nonpublic reasons that promote political justice.
23
 
Therefore, one can argue that his theorizing in Political Liberalism is not ideal in the sense of 
being completely disconnected from the real, nonideal world we are living in.
24
  
As I mentioned above, it is not the purpose of this work to focus on Rawls’s 
methodology; however, referring to it briefly seems unavoidable here as it clarifies the 
underlying ideas of Rawls’s principles of justice. These principles provide the ground on which 
he develops his political liberal conception of justice, namely, justice as fairness.
25
 Rawls 
believes that reasonable and rational persons would agree on his two principles of justice in the 
“Original Position,” where they are being unbiased and fair. Thus, in addition to the ideal 
conceptions of the citizen and the well-ordered society, Rawls’s methodology also relies on the 
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idea of the Original Position, which is the main feature of his contractarian approach. In Political 
Liberalism, the Original Position is defined as a device of representation that provides a 
hypothetical impartial viewpoint from which all parties’ representatives can agree on the same 
political principles of justice that are fair to all citizens as free and equal.
26
 To make sure that 
these derived principles of justice are not unfairly benefiting a person or a group more than 
others based on factors like social position, philosophical or religious beliefs, race, sex, mental or 
physical capacities, and so forth, they should be chosen fairly by forgetting about such 
characteristics; Rawls “express[es] these limits on information figuratively by saying the parties 
are behind a veil of ignorance.”27  
Here I briefly sketch the outcome principles of the Original Position thought experiment 
because they will help with understanding the idea of public reason in this chapter. The two 
principles of justice can be generally described as the liberty principle and the opportunity 
principle.
28
 According to the former, all citizens should have basic rights and liberties, which can 
include the right to vote, the right to freedom of expression, liberty of thought, liberty of 
conscience, and so on.
29
 The latter principle has two parts: the first part states that citizens should 
have an equal opportunity to gain a position in society regardless of their social and economic 
class, while the second part—namely, the difference principle—states that inequalities are 
acceptable only if “they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of 
society.”30  
Rawls first develops these two principles of justice as building blocks of his conception 
of justice, namely, justice as fairness, in his first book, A Theory of Justice (1971). He later 
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revises justice as fairness in Political Liberalism—which is the focus of this chapter—
introducing it as a political conception of justice. Moreover, he understands this political 
conception to be only one among a family of reasonable political conceptions. Although Rawls’s 
revision of his theory limits the subject matter of justice as fairness only to the political realm, it 
leaves its content, including the principles of justice, intact.
31
 The reason that Rawls redefines 
justice as fairness is because he realizes that it is not reasonable to ask all citizens to endorse the 
same conception of justice—which is a requirement of a well-ordered society in Theory of 
Justice—when they already believe in different such conceptions as a result of the different 
comprehensive doctrines they are following. In other words, Rawls reformulates the idea of a 
well-ordered society of justice as fairness in Political Liberalism, so that it is compatible with the 
“fact of reasonable pluralism.”32 According to this fact, in a democratic society where the basic 
rights and liberties of citizens are guaranteed, reasonable citizens will inevitably come up with 
different and irreconcilable philosophical (religious or nonreligious) conceptions of the good life. 
Thus Rawls makes a distinction between political conceptions of justice and irreconcilable 
religious, moral, and philosophical comprehensive doctrines. This reformulation of the idea of 
the well-ordered society is associated with redefining justice as fairness as a political conception, 
and thus limits its application to the “basic structure of society,” which means “society’s main 
political, constitutional, social, and economic institutions and how they fit together to form a 
unified scheme of social cooperation over time.”33  
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 Rawls, Political Liberalism, xlin8: “Not very much of the content of the doctrine of justice as fairness 
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So, the pluralism of reasonable doctrines is what Rawls claims leads him to introduce the 
idea of public reason, “the idea of a political conception of justice and so to the idea of political 
liberalism.”34 This is the main subject of the following section. 
2.2: The need for the idea of public reason 
In this section, I will illustrate Rawls’s motivation for introducing the idea of public 
reason, which stems from his recognizing the fact of reasonable pluralism in constitutional 
democratic societies. I will explain what Rawls means by comprehensive doctrines and political 
conceptions of justice, as well as how he distinguishes between them and shows that public 
reason cannot be given by the former but should be given by the latter. I will also outline what 
Rawls means by a reasonable person or a reasonable comprehensive doctrine—which sheds light 
on other notions that Rawls introduces, like the burdens of judgment and the criterion of 
reciprocity—and how they are related to the idea of public reason. 
According to Rawls, holding diverse and incompatible conceptions of the good life is a 
natural, inevitable, and reasonable outcome in a democratic society consisting of free and equal 
citizens.
35
 It would only be possible to have a society wherein all citizens agree on the same 
comprehensive worldview that tells them what the good life is like, be it religious or 
nonreligious, if there was an undemocratic state in power that forced people to do so and thus 
violated their freedom; this is what Rawls calls “the fact of oppression”.36 Examples of this kind 
of oppressive regime can be found now and throughout history. The government of the Islamic 
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republic of Iran, for example, expects all its citizens—one could even claim with good intentions 
of helping them lead what they think is the best life possible—to abide by the laws that are based 
on Islam, which is a religious comprehensive doctrine. As a result of this system, other 
comprehensive doctrines, like other religions or other moral or philosophical doctrines, do not 
have an equal voice in political deliberations and decision making, if they are not discriminated 
against or eliminated altogether. Another example of such regimes is the Soviet Union’s 
communism, which can be referred to as a secular comprehensive doctrine, which excluded 
religious citizens and citizens who believed in a different secular version of the good life from 
political participation, if not limiting their freedom from other nonpolitical aspects of their lives 
as well. These oppressive states are the result of trying to impose one comprehensive doctrine on 
all citizens, thus oppressing them and not treating those who follow a different comprehensive 
doctrine as free and equal. In other words, such regimes wrongly, Rawls believes, try to bring 
about social unity by coercing all citizens to endorse the same conception of the good life. They 
do not see or accept the fact of reasonable pluralism, and thus their governments have to use their 
state power to suppress any idea or action that is different from or in contradiction to the selected 
state ideology.  
On the contrary, Rawls’s liberal philosophy sees human beings as equal and free, no 
matter which comprehensive doctrine they decide to follow. To live in a democratic and non-
oppressive society, we should find a way to be able to live together under the same laws that are 
legitimate and so justifiable for all reasonable citizens, who themselves see other citizens as free 
and equal, regardless of their different comprehensive views. But with this irreconcilable, 
permanent plurality of comprehensive views, one could ask, as Rawls does, “how is it possible 
for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain 
18 
 
profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?”37 In his book 
Political Liberalism, Rawls attempts to answer this question by developing political liberalism as 
his political philosophy in which he constructs the idea of public reason.  
The main goal of political liberalism is to find an answer to both the legitimacy and the 
stability challenges. I discuss the first challenge here and the second challenge in the next 
section. By these challenges Rawls means the following questions: how can we legitimately 
coerce all free and equal citizens, who reasonably follow the plurality of comprehensive 
doctrines, to abide by the same laws? And how, in such a diverse environment can all citizens 
willingly abide by the same laws in order for the society to be justly stable for a long time? 
Rawls argues that the answer to these questions can be found in the “shared fundamental ideas 
implicit in the public political culture”38 of a democratic society and the “overlapping consensus” 
of reasonable comprehensive doctrines—which will be discussed in section 2.3—respectively.  
For Rawls, the public political culture of a democratic society “comprises the political 
institutions of a constitutional regime and the public traditions of their interpretation (including 
those of the judiciary), as well as historic texts and documents that are common knowledge.”39 
As can be seen, the public political culture, as opposed to the background culture, belongs to “the 
domain of the political.”40 Rawls believes that implicit in this political culture are fundamental 
ideas and principles that support “settled convictions [such] as the belief in religious toleration 
and the rejection of slavery”; these convictions can act as “provisional fixed points that it seems 
any reasonable conception must account for.” 41 As a result, these fundamental ideas and 
principles can provide a good source, which is independent from incompatible comprehensive 
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doctrines, for formulating a political conception of justice that all reasonable citizens can 
endorse.
42
  It is only with the help of such a generally acceptable political conception that the 
coercive laws can be justified to all reasonable citizens and thus become legitimate.   
In his political liberalism, Rawls introduces justice as fairness as an example of a 
reasonable political conception of justice, which uses the “fundamental organizing idea … of 
society as a fair system of social cooperation between free and equal persons viewed as fully 
cooperating members of society over a complete life.”43 He claims that using such an idea of 
society can systematically connect and relate ideas and principles within the political conception. 
Justice as fairness, Rawls believes, can likely be freely accepted as a reasonable political 
conception of justice by all reasonable moral, philosophical, and religious comprehensive 
doctrines, whether they are liberal or nonliberal.
44
 However, he does not expect all citizens to 
agree with him that this political conception is the most reasonable political conception of 
justice; he would be unreasonable if he did so because every political conception of justice that is 
consistent with the public political culture of a democratic society
45
 and also satisfies the 
“criterion of reciprocity” can be considered as a potential reasonable political conception of 
justice.
46
 Every time a basic liberty or right—like the abolishment of slavery or the right to 
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vote—is rejected, the criterion of reciprocity is also violated.47 The criterion of reciprocity then 
refers to the idea that “our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe 
that the reasons we offer for our political action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as 
a justification of those actions.”48 As a result, a political conception which is not potentially 
acceptable by all reasonable citizens cannot be a candidate for a political conception of justice 
that legitimates the coercive use of political power. 
It is important to note here that a political conception of justice, or a family of such 
conceptions, which serve as the basis for public reason, is not introduced to replace any 
comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious. Instead, a political conception of justice 
should be freestanding, which means that it should be independent from, and impartial towards, 
the plurality of comprehensive doctrines. In fact, unlike a comprehensive doctrine that is about a 
conception of the good life, the subject of a political conception is limited to the basic structure 
of society, which refers to “a society’s main political, social, and economic institutions, and how 
they fit together into one unified system of social cooperation from one generation to the next.”49  
So, not only conceptions of the good life, but also many political issues as well, are not the 
subject matter of such a political conception (or a family of such conceptions).  In fact, the 
reason to pursue a political conception of justice is only to “reach political agreement on at least 
the constitutional essentials and the basic questions of justice.”50 Having this shared public 
political ground makes political deliberation, political decision making, and justification of laws 
possible in a constitutional democratic society in which reasonable citizens reasonably disagree 
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on their comprehensive views. So drawing a distinction between comprehensive doctrines and 
political conceptions is the first step in Rawls’s theory of political liberalism to make it possible 
for all citizens to willingly abide by the same laws despite the fact of reasonable pluralism
51—
which refers to the irreconcilable, reasonable disagreements about what we believe to be the 
correct or true way of understanding the world. 
Rawls mentions that there are two kinds of disagreements; one is unreasonable and the 
other reasonable. On the one hand, unreasonable disagreements are usually the result of things 
like “prejudice and bias, self- and group interest … ignorance … perversity … rivalries for 
power, status, or economic gain.”52 One example of such a disagreement could be the case of oil 
or fossil fuel companies that disagree with most scientists about climate change because of their 
companies’ interest—that is, pursuing their self-interest at the expense of the common good. The 
sources of reasonable disagreements, on the other hand, which according to Rawls are not 
reconcilable, are the burdens of judgment
 
.
53
 Rawls defines these sources as “the many hazards 
involved in the correct (and conscientious) exercise of our powers of reason and judgment in the 
ordinary course of political life.”54 This kind of disagreement happens between free and 
reasonable people and is inevitable even in the best conditions possible. Rawls lists some of the 
burdens of judgement, which include complex, vague, and indeterminate evidence and concepts 
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that need to be assessed and interpreted, and also our different standpoints, which are the result 
of our different life experiences including gender, race, class, and occupation.
55
 One 
consequence of these reasonable sources of disagreement, according to Rawls, is the fact of 
reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines.
56
  
By learning from the burdens of judgment that not everything is justifiable to others—
like our moral and philosophical beliefs on how to lead a good and happy life—and accepting 
that these burdens apply to everyone equally, a reasonable person can and should develop “a 
democratic idea of toleration”57 to “endorse some form of liberty of conscience and freedom of 
thought.”58 Thus, accepting and respecting reasonable comprehensive doctrines other than the 
one a person believes to be correct or true, and not trying to force other people to what one 
believes, is the first requirement of being considered as a reasonable person. In contrast, people 
are not reasonable if they use their political power to force others to abandon their 
comprehensive doctrines in favor of what they approve of. Reasonable people do not look for 
consensus or social unity based on a shared comprehensive doctrine because they recognize that 
there can be reasonable disagreement between reasonable and free people over such doctrines. 
Thus, rather than trying to resolve such a disagreement, they respect other people’s different, 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines; they look for unity in the shared political values that shape 
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the idea of public reason. In Rawls’s words, a reasonable citizen is willing “to recognize the 
burdens of judgment and to accept their consequences for the use of public reason in directing 
the legitimate exercise of political power in a constitutional regime.”59  
The second requirement for being considered a reasonable person for Rawls is to regard 
all people as free and equal members of society. Reasonable citizens are concerned with the 
interests of all citizens, rather than merely their own, so they try to offer “fair terms of 
cooperation” that everyone, including themselves, can reasonably agree with, at the political 
level.
60
 Such fair terms of cooperation are, on the one hand, defined by a family of political 
conceptions of justice, which are based on the principles of justice implicit in the public political 
culture, including basic rights and liberties. On the other hand, they are related to the idea of 
reciprocity according to which all cooperating citizens “are to benefit in an appropriate way.” 61 
In other words, reasonable citizens are the ones who try to propose and abide by the terms that 
fulfill the criterion of reciprocity, according to which “citizens offering [fair terms of 
cooperation] must reasonably think that those citizens to whom such terms are offered might 
also reasonably accept them. And they must be able to do this as free and equal.”62 To explain, if 
a group of citizens want to exercise legitimate political power in a constitutional democratic 
society, to justify a political decision or a law that is binding to all citizens, they need to explain 
those decisions and laws to others by offering reasons that can fulfil the criterion of reciprocity. 
This means that they should give reasons that they can reasonably expect all citizens, including 
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themselves, to reasonably and potentially understand and accept, without any oppressive force in 
power.  
Being reasonable is very important for Rawls because he sees it as something that 
“addresses the public world of others,” and as “part of a political ideal of democratic citizenship 
that includes the idea of public reason.”63 According to this understanding of reasonable, the 
ideal of democratic citizenship can be achieved when citizens accept the fact that there can be 
reasonable disagreement over what citizens consider true comprehensive views, while at the 
same time, they are willing to mutually cooperate with others as free and equal to propose fair 
terms of cooperation at the political level that all can endorse.  These fair terms, which are 
characterized by political conceptions of justice, can be the basis of the reasons that reasonable 
citizens use to explain to other reasonable citizens the political decisions that affect everyone in 
society. Such reasons are Rawlsian public reasons, whose principles, guidelines, and procedures 
“are seen as selected in the original position and belong to the political conception of justice.”64 I 
will discuss the idea of public reason in more detail in section 2.3. 
Here, it is worth noting that Rawls considers an acceptable political conception of justice 
to be reasonable rather than true. This is because its subject is limited to political values that 
citizens with different comprehensive views can share and thus use to justify the laws that are 
binding for everyone.
65
 Furthermore, Rawls argues that although people normally see their own 
comprehensive doctrines as true, they are not expected to have the same judgment about other 
comprehensive doctrines—which they normally do not, because comprehensive doctrines are 
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incompatible—in order to respect and tolerate them; to achieve this purpose, it is enough to 
recognize such doctrines as reasonable. A reasonable person, who is aware of the consequences 
of the burdens of judgement and sees all citizens as free and equal, can also see other 
comprehensive doctrines, which are followed by reasonable persons, as reasonable. Although 
Rawls substitutes the notion of truth with reasonable, he knows that it might not be easy to 
imagine a plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, because we usually think that 
reasonable means true, and there is only one truth. But considering his definition of reasonable, 
which was discussed above, this is not so.
66
 Rawls argues that we cannot decide whether a 
person’s belief, based on her comprehensive view, is true or false because we do not have “a 
shared public basis” to do that. However, this is not the case for deciding whether it is reasonable 
or not.
67
  
Reasonableness applies to a comprehensive doctrine when it is followed by a reasonable 
citizen who respects the reasonable disagreement between herself and others, sees all citizens as 
free and equal, and sees society as a fair system of cooperation.
68
 Almost all traditional 
comprehensive doctrines, which seem to include the major religions like Judaism, Christianity, 
Islam, and Buddhism, can be considered to be reasonable, unless they insist on imposing 
themselves, using political power, on citizens who hold a different doctrine.
69
 Another feature of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines is that, although they are stable through time, they are still 
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open to some modification based on the reasons that they find acceptable.
70
 This tendency to 
evolve makes it possible for them to become compatible with political conceptions of justice.  
Rawls intentionally avoids a more strict definition of reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
because he is very careful not to call any comprehensive doctrine unreasonable too quickly and 
thus exclude them arbitrarily.
71
 Another reason for this, I believe, can be found in his belief that 
most religious and philosophical doctrines are only partially comprehensive.
72
 This means that 
they include only some, and not all, “nonpolitical values and virtues” or articulate them all 
precisely within a system;
73
 in other words, most comprehensive doctrines are “neither 
systematic nor complete.”74 As a result, it is possible that a slippage happens and followers of a 
(partially) comprehensive doctrine endorse a political conception of justice, even loosely, for the 
reason that they might find it valuable for themselves and their society. Rawls even goes further, 
claiming that it is possible that when comprehensive doctrines are not compatible with the 
political conception of justice, reasonable citizens choose to “adjust or revise” their doctrines to 
fit with the political conception.
75
 Despite Rawls’s reluctance to call a specific comprehensive 
doctrine unreasonable, it is not hard to find examples of unreasonable (interpretations of) 
religious or secular doctrines that encourage their followers to impose their comprehensive view 
on other citizens with different comprehensive views. These followers of unreasonable 
comprehensive doctrines—or unreasonable versions of comprehensive doctrines—only care 
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about what they believe to be the true conception of the good life rather than accepting what is 
reasonable; they do not recognize and/or accept that there can be a reasonable disagreement 
between people. Different (fundamentalist) religious groups that are looking for political power 
to suppress other citizens into believing and acting as they do, for example imposing laws to ban 
homosexuality, or forcing all women (Muslim or non-Muslim) to wear hijab, can be seen as 
unreasonable. 
The first and main difference between political conceptions of justice and comprehensive 
doctrines is that, according to Rawls, the former constitutes a narrower domain of morality, 
which is limited to political, social, and economic issues.
76
 While people do reasonably disagree 
on comprehensive doctrines that they hold, one could be hopeful that, despite this irreconcilable, 
reasonable disagreement, they could still freely endorse the same political conception, or the 
same family of political conceptions,
77
 and make political decisions—which are going to result 
in binding laws for all citizens—based on them. Making political decisions and explaining them 
based on such shared grounds can help justify the laws that are passed for all reasonable citizens 
to abide by, whether they agree with them or not, like, for example, property laws or criminal 
laws. It thus maintains the democratic nature of the laws and the process of law-making, which is 
justifiable for all reasonable citizens regardless of the comprehensive doctrine they hold, as 
opposed to nondemocratic oppressive regimes, which do not care about the justifiability and thus 
legitimacy of the laws for the citizens they apply to.  
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Another difference between political conceptions and comprehensive doctrines is that 
they apply to different subjects. The (primary) subject of the former is the basic structure of 
society, while the latter is about “what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, 
as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships.”78 As mentioned 
above, an example of a political conception of justice that is about the basic structure of society 
is justice as fairness, while utilitarianism could be an example of a secular comprehensive 
doctrine that is about how to live a good life. 
A further difference between political conceptions of justice and comprehensive doctrines 
is that the content of the former belongs to “the public political culture of a democratic society,” 
which includes, for example, the parliament and the judiciary organs, and the debates between 
political parties, while the latter is linked to “the background culture of civil society,” which has 
a social character rather than a political one, and includes places like universities, churches, and 
scientific institutions.
79
 It is very important to note that, although the political conception is 
independent from all comprehensive doctrines, according to Rawls, it does not oppose any 
reasonable comprehensive doctrine and does not compete with any of them.
80
 In fact, if a 
comprehensive doctrine is reasonable, it should support the political conception of justice.  
Rawls argues that one should not think that conflicting comprehensive doctrines will be a 
barrier to achieving social unity because, as was mentioned earlier, the diversity of such 
conflicting doctrines is the natural result of having burdens of judgment and living as free and 
equal citizens, and it is not something that can be eliminated. Therefore, we should look for a 
basis for social unity and peace somewhere else: in a reasonable political conception of justice, 
which includes “principles of justice, guidelines of inquiry that specify ways of reasoning and 
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criteria for the kinds of information relevant for political questions.”81 Such conceptions are what 
help us formulate the content of public reason, which is generally understandable and acceptable 
for all reasonable citizens regardless of what comprehensive doctrine they hold.
82
 The content 
and scope of public reason and how Rawls envisions it will be discussed in the next section. 
2.3: Elaborating the idea of public reason 
In this section, first I will provide a sketch of public reason, explaining its distinction 
from nonpublic reasons. Then, I will discuss how the idea of public reason helps justify and thus 
legitimate coercive laws in a constitutional democratic society. I will also look into how Rawls’s 
idea of an overlapping consensus can explain the willingness of citizens (either as officials who 
exercise the powers of public office and candidates for public office, or as ordinary citizens who 
vote on a fundamental political issue) with a diversity of worldviews to use public reason, and 
even prioritize it over their cherished nonpublic reasons, and by doing so, bring stability to 
society for the right reason. 
According to Samuel Freeman,
83
 Rawls explains the idea of public reason through two 
different routes. First, by acknowledging the legitimacy challenge, which deals with the question 
of how to duly exercise our coercive political power over each other as free and equal citizens in 
a way that can be justified in a democratic society consisting of a plurality of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines; and second, by defining the idea of public reason in relation to justice 
as fairness, which is a political conception of justice that Rawls finds the most reasonable among 
other such conceptions. Here, however, I want to argue that these two routes can hardly be 
considered as two separate and independent ways of dealing with the idea of public reason. Thus, 
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I prefer to call them the macroscopic and the microscopic accounts of public reason respectively. 
The macroscopic account provides us with an explanation of why we need public reason in a 
constitutional democratic society, while the microscopic account goes into detail about what 
public reason really is according to justice as fairness as an example of a political conception of 
justice. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss these accounts in order. 
The legitimacy challenge is formed around the idea of persons as free and equal citizens 
who have a political relationship among each other within the basic structure of a democratic 
society in which they are born, live, and die. In such a society, political power is shared between 
all these citizens as “a collective body.”84 Since this political power is coercive, and since it is a 
fact that free and reasonable persons inevitably follow different and irreconcilable views of the 
good life, exercising such a power could result in oppressing a group or groups of citizens with 
certain comprehensive views by other groups of citizens with opposing comprehensive views. In 
order to maintain the democratic system in which everyone respects each other as free and equal 
in a way that everyone can live their lives as they see fit, Rawls believes that citizens have a 
moral duty to use public reason as a common ground to justify the political decisions that they 
make, either through voting or other ways of supporting a policy. Thus, Rawls’s characterization 
of public reason “in a democratic society … is the reason of equal citizens who, as a collective 
body, exercise final political and coercive power over one another in enacting laws and in 
amending their constitution.”85 Fulfilling the duty to use such reason, and a willingness to listen 
to others, which Rawls defines as the (moral) duty of civility,
86
 means attaining the ideal of 
democratic citizenship, and legitimating citizens’ use of political power.  
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So, Rawls believes that citizens’ political power is used properly when they appeal to 
public reason as their common ground for political deliberation and decision making; this is his 
solution to the legitimacy challenge. However, Rawls does not see all political issues as subject 
matters for public reason. Citizens only have the duty to use public reason when they are dealing 
with fundamental political issues, that is, the constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. 
These include: 
  
fundamental principles that specify the general structure of government and the political 
process: [such as] the powers of the legislature, executive and the judiciary; the scope of 
majority rule; [and] equal basic rights and liberties of citizens… such as the right to vote 
and to participate in politics, liberty of conscience, freedom of thought and of association, 
as well as the protections of the rule of law.87  
 
 
So, some examples of fundamental political questions are, “who has the right to vote, or what 
religions are to be tolerated, or who is to be assured fair equality of opportunity or to hold 
property.”88 Also, current controversial issues like a right to abortion as a women’s right and a 
right to same-sex marriage are among such fundamental issues.  
According to Rawls, in a democratic society, the constitutional essentials should be 
justified to and thus supported by all reasonable citizens regardless of their comprehensive views 
of life. This can be done by explaining those essentials in terms of public reason, which includes 
reasons that are potentially understandable and acceptable to all those reasonable citizens. So, the 
idea of public reason is presented by Rawls through the liberal principle of legitimacy, which is 
as follows: “our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is 
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be 
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expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and 
rational.”89 Rawls gives as an example of a non-fundamental political issue the declaration of a 
“National Fast Day” and “Thanksgiving” by Lincoln. He argues that the ideal of public reason 
does not seem to be violated by Lincoln because he was not addressing a fundamental political 
issue.
90
 Rawls gives other examples of non-fundamental political issues, including “much tax 
legislation and many laws regulating property; statutes protecting the environment and 
controlling pollution; establishing national parks and preserving wilderness areas and animal and 
plant species; and laying aside funds for museums and the arts.” However, he also contends that 
“sometimes these do involve fundamental matters.”91 
Rawls’s second route to the idea of public reason, or as I like to call it, the microscopic 
view, is connected to the first route and shows how public reason is formulated by justice as 
fairness in particular, and a family of political conceptions of justice in general. For Rawls, a 
political conception of justice consists of two parts: “substantive principles of justice for the 
basic structure” and “guidelines of inquiry that specify ways of reasoning” by which the 
principles of justice are applied.
92
 The principles of justice, which were mentioned in section 2.1, 
characterize “the values of political justice,” such as “the values of equal political and civil 
liberty; equality of opportunity; the values of social equality and economic reciprocity,” while 
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the guidelines characterize “the values of public reason.”93 In justice as fairness, Rawls sees both 
the principles of justice and the guidelines of inquiry specified by the same criterion, that is, the 
Original Position. In this hypothetical situation that Rawls describes as a device of 
representation,
94
 representatives of different groups of citizens not only agree on the same 
principles of justice, but they also accept the same guidelines of inquiry that shape the values of 
public reason to apply those principles. In other words, the representatives come up with 
guidelines for applying the principles of justice that all citizens are expected to potentially 
understand and accept regardless of their comprehensive worldviews; thus, the liberal principle 
of legitimacy is satisfied.  
Rawls points out that citizens might reasonably choose different criteria and political 
conceptions as the best and most reasonable ones, which will result in different forms of political 
liberalism. What all these forms of political liberalism, and so political conceptions of justice, 
have in common are liberal principles of justice and some guidelines of public reason.
95
 In his 
later work in 1997, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, Rawls mentions Habermasian discourse 
theory and “Catholic views of the common good and solidarity when they are expressed in terms 
of political values,”96 as two examples of acceptable political conceptions of justice which might 
be seen by some citizens as the most reasonable conceptions. Rawls argues that disagreement 
over what is the most reasonable political conception is not something to be worried about; on 
the contrary, it is anticipated and even unavoidable because the public political culture consists 
of different fundamental ideas that can be developed into different political conceptions of 
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justice. But Rawls is hopeful that citizens might eventually come to agreement on the most 
reasonable political conception. He says, “[a]n orderly contest between them [appropriate 
political conceptions of justice] over time is a reliable way to find which one, if any, is most 
reasonable.”97  
In all reasonable political conceptions, the idea of public reason provides citizens with a 
framework to lead their political discussions about fundamental political issues “based on values 
that the others can reasonably be expected to endorse.”98 In other words, whether we accept 
Rawls’s justice as fairness or another political conception as the most reasonable one, the content 
of public reason, as Rawls clearly asserts in his 1997 article, “is given by the principles and 
values of the family of liberal political conceptions of justice”99 and in order to provide public 
justification for our coercive political power, we need to appeal to such a reason. One can hope 
that there is always, or most of the time, public reason when dealing with a fundamental political 
issue because Rawls hopes that the content of public reason, namely political conceptions of 
justice, should be complete, which means that they should have “a reasonable answer for all or 
nearly all fundamental questions.”100 
A third way to define public reason can be through contrasting it with nonpublic reasons, 
which Rawls emphasizes are different from private reasons.
101
 For Rawls, public reason  
is public in three ways: as the reason of citizens as such, it is the reason of the public; its 
subject is the good of the public and matters of fundamental justice; and its nature and 
content is public, being given by the ideals and principles expressed by society’s 
conception of political justice, and conducted open to view on that basis.
102
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He claims that “there are many nonpublic reasons and but one public reason.”103 While public 
reason is formulated by a family of political conceptions of justice as a common ground between 
all reasonable citizens, nonpublic reasons are based on people’s religious, moral, and 
philosophical comprehensive doctrines. Put differently, while public reason is based on the 
public political culture, and as Rawls mentions later, should be more rigorously used in the 
public political forum consisting of judges, government officials, and candidates for public 
office,
104
 nonpublic reasons belong to the social culture of the civil society, which is called by 
Rawls “the background culture.” So, nonpublic reasons are the reasons of different associations 
with different purposes within a society, such as churches, universities, scientific associations, 
and clubs.
105
  
Despite the differences between public and nonpublic reasons, they both share some 
qualities as reasons like including “standards of correctness and criteria of Justification,”106 
which distinguish them from other ways of using the language and mind, such as rhetoric or 
storytelling. The main difference between public reason and nonpublic reasons is that the former 
only deals with political issues and is impartial towards different comprehensive doctrines, so 
consequently it can be expected to be endorsed by all reasonable citizens regardless of their 
worldviews; whereas the latter deals with “personal and associational decisions”107 that are based 
on a doctrine that is accepted by the members of an association, and thus it is not expected to be 
endorsed by other reasonable citizens. To illustrate, in the case of religious comprehensive 
doctrines, a certain group of Muslims might believe that women must cover their hair in front of 
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men who are not their close family members. The reason that they give for this rule is based on 
The Quran, the holy book of Muslims. This reason is a nonpublic reason because it is only 
acceptable to the members of this Muslim community, thus it cannot be used as a basis of public 
justification for a Hijab rule as a legitimate coercive law for all the other citizens in society.  
According to Rawls, nonpublic reasons “are public with respect to their members, but 
nonpublic with respect to political society, and so nonpublic with respect to citizens 
generally.”108 It is also worth noting that, although it is acceptable for associations to have their 
own rules and reasons, namely their “nonpublic authority,”109 in a democratic society, if a person 
does not want to continue being a member of an association—in the above example if a person 
no longer wants to be a member of that Muslim community—that association no longer has 
authority over that person and as a result cannot punish that person for not abiding by their rules; 
this is because in a democratic society all citizens equally have basic liberties and rights, like 
freedom of conscience and freedom of thought, and so they are free to convert to whatever 
comprehensive doctrine they want. 
It is important to note that when Rawls defines public reason and nonpublic reason, he 
mentions secular reasons among the latter group. This is because he sees secular reasons and 
values as belonging to comprehensive doctrines that cannot be expected to be endorsed by all 
reasonable citizens. Although it seems that in Political Liberalism Rawls only expresses this 
view implicitly by writing “nonreligious comprehensive doctrines,” in his later works he does 
not leave any doubt about the difference between public reason and secular reason. In The Idea 
of Public Reason Revisited, Rawls says that “[w]e must distinguish public reason from what is 
sometimes referred to as secular reason and secular values. These are not the same as public 
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reason. For I define secular reason as reasoning in terms of comprehensive nonreligious 
doctrines. Such doctrines and values are much too broad to serve the purposes of public 
reason.”110 And, as was mentioned earlier, the main purpose of public reason is providing a basis 
for public justification of the coercive laws for all reasonable citizens to legitimate such laws in a 
democratic society. 
Rawls claims that his theory of political liberalism is not a comprehensive doctrine, 
which means it is not a secular, religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine that competes with 
other comprehensive doctrines. Political liberalism acknowledges the fact of reasonable 
pluralism, according to which reasonable citizens will naturally endorse different comprehensive 
doctrines in a free society. Its aim is to be impartial toward all reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines—whether they are religious, nonreligious, liberal, or nonliberal. Being impartial and 
independent from comprehensive doctrines thus opens up the possibility for political liberalism, 
which is limited to the political aspect of people’s lives, to be accepted by all reasonable 
citizens.
111
 To achieve this aim, Rawls’s solution is to formulate reasonable political conceptions 
of justice based on the fundamental ideas implicit in the public political culture of a democratic 
society.  
But here, although the subject of the political liberalism is limited to the domain of the 
political, there is still the question of how it is possible that all citizens accept the same political 
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conceptions of justice as reasonable while they are endorsing incompatible comprehensive 
doctrines. This is a more pressing question when we consider situations where people’s 
comprehensive views, which they think give them the truth about the world and life, and their 
interests are not exactly in line with the political conception of justice. Rawls expects from 
reasonable citizens that, when they are dealing with fundamental political issues, rather than 
being guided by either their preferences and interests or what they see as the whole truth, they act 
according to their duty of civility and use public reason.
112
 So, Rawls notes that there might be a 
paradox lying here. He asks, “[h]ow can it be either reasonable or rational, when basic matters 
are at stake, for citizens to appeal only to a public conception of justice and not to the whole truth 
as they see it?”113  
Rawls attempts to resolve this paradox partly by addressing the legitimacy challenge, as 
discussed above, and partly by addressing the stability challenge, which asks: how can a 
constitutional democratic society that treats all its citizens justly regardless of their 
comprehensive views remain stable for a long time? Rawls responds that a compromise between 
comprehensive doctrines or “a mere balance of power (a modus vivendi),”114 or even looking for 
an average between existing comprehensive doctrines, cannot result in a long-term stability. This 
is because the stability of a modus vivendi can easily be threatened by the shift of power, and the 
stability of finding an average between existing comprehensive doctrines “is not how justice as 
fairness proceeds.”115 To achieve a long-term stability for the right reason, namely one that is not 
the result of an oppressive power or a compromise, Rawls believes that people should really be 
willing to abide by the coercive laws. Therefore, the strongest stability can exist if all reasonable 
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citizens with all their different comprehensive views have an overlapping consensus on political 
conceptions of justice.  
Although Rawls does not claim that such a consensus is something that can surely be 
achieved, he argues that if we can find political conceptions that are freestanding, that is, 
independent from and thus impartial towards all the reasonable comprehensive doctrines, we can 
be hopeful of achieving this consensus in a well-ordered constitutional society.
116
 In the presence 
of an overlapping consensus, the political conception of justice is defined by Rawls as a module 
that is included in all reasonable comprehensive doctrines and as a result it is endorsed by those 
doctrines from inside—that is, by their own nonpublic reasons. In Rawls’s words, “the political 
conception is a module, an essential constituent part, that in different ways fits into and can be 
supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endure in the society regulated by 
it.”117 When there is an overlapping consensus, all reasonable citizens support the same 
principles of justice from within their comprehensive views. For example, reasonable atheists, 
reasonable Buddhists, reasonable utilitarians, reasonable Christians, reasonable Muslims, and all 
the other reasonable citizens can support political values such as the abolishment of slavery or 
the freedom of conscience using reasons that belong particularly to each of their doctrines.  
To completely resolve the paradox of using the political values that belong to political 
conceptions of justice rather than using what one believes to be the whole truth, Rawls adds that 
such political values “are very great values and not easily overridden and the ideals they express 
are not to be lightly abandoned.”118 In other words, these political values and public reason 
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outweigh other values and nonpublic reasons when dealing with constitutional essentials and 
matters of basic justice. As a result, in a well-ordered society with an overlapping consensus on 
political conceptions, reasonable citizens are willing to give priority to the values of political 
conceptions (and thus public reason) over other values given by their different comprehensive 
doctrines, in case they do not match completely, when they are discussing and making decision 
about fundamental political issues. But one could ask whether the paradox is also resolved for 
not completely well-ordered societies, that is, real pluralistic democratic societies like Canada or 
the United States, where an overlapping consensus between all reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines on political conceptions of justice is not firm. In such societies, is it reasonable to 
expect citizens to use public reason rather than nonpublic reasons that are based on their 
comprehensive views which they believe to be true? Whether the answer is yes or no, how is the 
role of the idea of public reason similar to or different from its role in a well-ordered democratic 
regime? 
As I mentioned in section 2.1, although Rawls develops his idea of public reason in an 
idealized system of a well-ordered society, he is not ignorant of the difference between this 
idealized picture he draws and real societies. The ideal of public reason for him “contains a form 
of public political deliberation”119 in which citizens can explain to each other how they are 
supporting a certain law or policy by referring to political values that they know can also be 
endorsed by other reasonable citizens. In the following section, I will discuss how the ideal of 
public reason can be satisfied in ideal and nonideal societies. In short, Rawls believes that in 
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some conditions, appealing to nonpublic reasons—including religious reasons—can also help 
fulfill the ideal of public reason.  
2.4: The place of religious reasons in the ideal of public reason  
Rawls does not treat religious reasons differently from other nonpublic reasons, which 
include secular, philosophical, and moral reasons. In a well-ordered society, citizens have the 
moral duty of civility to explain to each other why they are advocating a certain policy that deals 
with the fundamental political issues by using public reason. This is because in a democratic 
society where citizens are following a plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, they need 
a common ground, namely political values, that are just and fair to all citizens and so potentially 
understandable and acceptable by all of them. Using public reason in political deliberation and 
decision making thus honours this fair and just common ground and so justifies citizens’ binding 
political decisions to each other.   
However, Rawls is well aware that it is not always the case for a society to be well-
ordered, in the sense that all its citizens know that there is a firm overlapping consensus between 
their diverse doctrines regarding values of political justice. He argues that a society could be 
almost well-ordered with a deep disagreement on how to apply a certain principle of justice, or it 
could be not well-ordered at all with a deep disagreement over the constitutional essentials. 
Based on the kind of society that we are living in, Rawls looks for the best way that citizens can 
act to attain or maintain the ideal of public reason and establish political justice. Using public 
reason for deciding and explaining a binding law is the best way to maintain and honour such an 
ideal in a well-ordered society. However, in nonideal societies, Rawls believes that referring to 
one’s comprehensive doctrine, for example appealing to one’s religious reasons to abolish 
slavery, can sometimes be a better way of attaining the ideal of public reason and political 
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justice. In other words, he argues that “the appropriate limits of public reason vary depending on 
historical and social conditions.”120   
Rawls makes a distinction between the “exclusive view” and the “inclusive view” of 
public reason. According to him, the first view only applies to well-ordered societies where there 
is no deep disagreement between citizens with regards to the political values they endorse; to put 
it in other words, there is “a firm overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines” among 
their citizens.
121
 In such societies, citizens should never give nonpublic reasons in their 
deliberations about fundamental political questions; citizens can directly appeal to generally 
accepted political values to fulfill their duty of civility and the ideal of public reason. This is the 
ideal form of society in which citizens’ “fundamental rights are already guaranteed and there are 
no basic injustices they feel bound to protest.”122  
On the other hand, Rawls believes that the more appropriate approach for both well-
ordered societies without a firm overlapping consensus among their citizens, and non-well-
ordered societies with deep disagreements on the constitutional essentials, is “the inclusive 
view.” This view allows citizens to give nonpublic reasons in their deliberations about 
fundamental political questions, provided that the ideal of public reason is fulfilled. Rawls points 
out that which of these two views we choose depends on which one of them better helps us in the 
current historical and social condition we are in to achieve a just society and the ideal of public 
reason. He says, “the ideal [of public reason] may be best achieved in different ways, in good 
times by following what at first sight may appear to be the exclusive view, in less good times by 
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what appears to be the inclusive view.”123 In other words, in the case of nonideal societies, the 
inclusive view can be more helpful in achieving the ideal of public reason. 
It seems to me that the second scenario—according to which the society is nearly well-
ordered but there are disagreements over the interpretation of a political principle of justice—is 
the closest picture to what Rawls understands of American society of his time. He mentions the 
controversial issue of whether the government should support church schools or is only 
responsible for public schools as an example of a dispute over “the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity as it applies to education for all.”124 In this case, it is possible that the two sides of 
this dispute “come to doubt the sincerity of one another’s allegiance to fundamental political 
values.”125 To resolve this doubt, Rawls argues that if the leaders of the two parties appeal to 
their comprehensive doctrines in the public political forum to show each other that their 
doctrines support those political values, they might be able to recognize their overlapping 
consensus again and show each other that they are not living in a mere modus vivendi. For 
Rawls, “[t]his knowledge surely strengthens mutual trust and public confidence” and “can be a 
vital part of the sociological basis encouraging citizens to honor the ideal of public reason.”126 
Therefore, it can be concluded that using religious reasons in the public political forum to discuss 
fundamental political questions—as long as it reminds the citizens that they are sharing the same 
political values—not only is not disallowed by Rawls, he finds it even to be a better way of 
achieving the ideal of public reason in nonideal but well-ordered societies. 
 In the third scenario, in which the society is not well-ordered, the role of religious 
reasons (and other nonpublic reasons) in achieving the ideal of public reason and political justice 
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is more clear. Based on the examples that Rawls uses for this kind of society—the abolitionist 
movement of slavery and the civil rights movement of Martin Luther King—one could 
correspond this scenario to the American society of 17
th
 and 18
th
 century, when basic rights and 
liberties of persons were not recognized or respected.  In such social and political conditions, 
appealing to religious reasons to support freedom and equality does not seem to be against the 
political values of public reason; on the contrary, doing so can strengthen those values. In the 
cases of the abolitionists and King, Rawls believes that they were not unreasonable in appealing 
to their religious reasons because “they could have seen their actions as the best way to bring 
about a well-ordered and just society in which the ideal of public reason could eventually be 
honored.”127 He argues that taking the inclusive view in such cases is a better way of honouring 
the ideal of public reason and a better way to lead the society to political justice. Therefore, to 
answer the question of “whether we should understand the ideal of public reason in accordance 
with the exclusive or the inclusive view,” Rawls points out that it depends “on which view best 
encourages citizens to honor the ideal of public reason and secures its social conditions in the 
longer run in a well-ordered society.” He concludes that “the inclusive view seems the correct 
one.”128 In other words, in the case of nonideal societies, Rawls not only does not discourage 
offering nonpublic reasons in public political debates, he also argues that doing this could fulfill 
the ideal of public reason even better than offering public reason. 
Although in Political Liberalism Rawls clearly mentions that religious reasons can be 
appealed to in order to develop and maintain the political values of public reason in a nonideal 
society, some religious philosophers still believe that his idea of public reason not only is 
unnecessary but also that it discourages religious citizens from participating in political 
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deliberations. Among these philosophers is Nicholas Wolterstorff, whose ideas I will discuss in 
detail in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Wolterstorff’s Arguments against Public Reason and Critical Analysis  
 
In the previous chapter I explained John Rawls’s theory of political liberalism—or as it is 
also called, public reason liberalism—within which the idea of public reason has a central role. I 
showed that Rawls introduces two different views, exclusive and inclusive, for honouring the 
ideal of public reason, only the second of which is relevant to nonideal pluralistic democratic 
societies like Canada or the United States. In this chapter I will explain Nicholas Wolterstorff’s 
alternative account of liberal democracy, which he claims to be more liberal and fair than 
Rawls’s account. After laying out his criticisms of Rawls’s idea of public reason and his restraint 
on religious reasons, I will analyze his arguments and outline their flaws. I will show that his 
arguments are not consistent in rejecting Rawls’s restraint on religious reasons in public political 
discussions. Meanwhile, I will introduce and explain Rawls’s revised view of public reason, 
namely, the wide view of public political culture, according to which citizens are free to use any 
kind of reason in political deliberation with the proviso that it is supplemented by suitable public 
reason in due course. I will then compare it to the exclusive and inclusive views as well as 
Wolterstorff’s views and show that it is the most feasible account for bringing social peace in a 
pluralistic democratic society. Finally, I will argue that Wolterstorff  is not successful in rejecting 
Rawls’s idea of public reason because there are contradictions in Wolterstorff’s arguments and 
his criticisms do not address Rawls’s wide view.  Let me first provide an outline of this chapter. 
In section 3.1, I will provide an overview of Wolterstorff’s positive accounts of liberal 
democracy, namely, the consocial position and the equal political voice account. In section 3.2, I 
will explain Wolterstorff’s main criticisms of public reason liberalism according to which 
Rawls’s restraint on religious reasons in public political deliberations is not compatible with the 
Idea of liberal democracy and that the notion of freestanding shared principles are misguided. In 
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section 3.3, I will highlight flaws in Wolterstorff’s arguments, both in his positive account and 
his criticisms of Rawls, and respond to them. I will use Wolterstorff’s response to an example 
put forward by Erik A. Anderson to show that he contradicts himself and thus fails to support his 
no-restraint position on religious reasons. In section 3.4, I will present Wolterstorff’s integrity 
objection according to which citizens’ moral duty to use public reason is not defensible because 
there are two groups of reasonable religious citizens—the religious integralists, the barthian and 
the eberlian—who believe that, in public political debates, in order to be faithful to their religion 
they must either only use religious reasons (the barthian) or always give priority to religious 
reasons in case they conflict with public reason (the eberlian). I will end this section by arguing 
against this objection, claiming that complete integrity is not realistic and it is in fact in conflict 
with Wolterstorff’s other arguments. Moreover, such religious citizens in office could threaten 
the neutrality of the state and, as a result, social peace in a pluralistic liberal democracy. 
3.1: Wolterstorff’s positive account of liberal democracy 
In 1997, in his debate with Robert Audi in Religion in the Public Square, Wolterstorff 
claims that his own version of liberal democracy, namely, the consocial position, is more liberal 
than Rawls’s political liberalism because it “wishes to grant citizens, no matter what their 
religion or irreligion, as much liberty as possible to live out their lives as they see fit.”129 He 
argues that, unlike the Rawlsian position, this version of liberalism really allows religious 
citizens to exercise their religions freely. The consocial position has two parts: a negative part 
and a positive part.  The negative part concerns a major difference between Wolterstorff’s 
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position and that of Rawls. The consocial position does not exclude religious reasons from public 
political discussions. It abandons the idea of looking for freestanding political conceptions of 
justice or what Wolterstorff calls “an independent source.”130 In the positive part of his position, 
Wolterstorff offers three sorts of “restraints”131 on public political deliberation that “belong to 
the ethic of the citizen in a liberal democracy.”132 I call these three restraints the manner restraint, 
the constitution restraint, and the justice restraint.  
 First, the manner restraint suggests that there should be some restraints on the manner in 
which citizens participate in public political discourse. Citizens should respect one another by 
listening and being open to what others say. In other words, in discussions, citizens should listen 
to each other “with a willingness to learn and to let one's mind be changed.”133 The second 
restraint, the constitution restraint, requires that discussions be restricted by the constitutional 
laws of the state. However, this restraint does not hold for extreme circumstances.
134
 The third 
restraint states that discussions should not be based on citizens’ self-interests. Instead, they 
should be restrained in a way that can satisfy the proper goal of liberal democracy, which is 
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political justice. This goal is what Wolterstorff’s version of liberalism shares (as he himself 
acknowledges) with Rawls’s political liberalism. 
In his later works, Wolterstorff develops his new positive account of liberal democracy 
which he calls “the equal political voice interpretation of liberal democracy.”135 According to 
this account, “the governing idea implicit in constitutional liberal democracy is [that] … all adult 
citizens have an equal right to full political voice” supported by the constitution, against the state 
and other citizens infringing on those rights.
136
 Wolterstorff argues that within the constitutional 
framework, this type of liberalism does not introduce any restrictions on the kinds of reasons 
citizens use in political deliberation, nor on their aims and motivations when using their political 
voice. However, he introduces some other moral rules: citizens “ought to exercise their political 
voice as a moral engagement and in an epistemologically responsible manner.”137 I believe that 
one can understand these two requirements as capturing the two restraints of manner and justice, 
introduced in Wolterstorff’s earlier account, namely, the consocial position. The constitution 
restraint is also maintained in Wolterstorff’s equal political voice account as it is assumes 
“constitutional liberal democracy.”138 More specifically, citizens’ equal right to political voice is 
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limited by a constitution that protects citizens against the violation of their rights to equal 
political voice and also against “being wronged”139 by either government or other citizens.140 
To explain the two requirements, firstly, citizens exercise their right to political voice as a 
moral engagement when they advocate or vote for a candidate or a policy in a way that serves the 
common good and does not result in injustice. This includes adopting a manner free from 
insulting other citizens and treating them unjustly. This first requirement includes the manner 
and the justice restraints. Secondly, citizens exercise their right to political voice in an 
epistemologically responsible manner when they have checked their beliefs and judgments and 
thus are entitled to them. More specifically, to be entitled to one’s views, one should listen with 
an open mind to “well-considered objections and well-considered alternatives to one’s own 
views that are not morally corrupt.”141 Wolterstorff points out that such listening happens in a 
context where citizens hold a plurality of comprehensive doctrines on which they ground their 
reasons in support of or in opposition to a policy. This second requirement includes the manner 
restraint.  
To better explain his account of liberalism, Wolterstorff provides the following example. 
Imagine a professor who wants to let his students determine the rules of their class by ensuring 
that students have equal voice. The first step is for the students to share their preferred rules and 
support them with whatever reasons they wish. In Wolterstorff’s words, “everybody has the right 
to be free to state to their fellow classmates the rules and arrangements they prefer and their 
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reasons for preferring them, whatever those reasons be.”142 This reason-giving should be 
“without anyone in any way bullying other members of the class, and … everybody is also 
encouraged to listen with open mind to whatever reasons other members of the class offer for or 
against some proposed rule.”143 In the second step, since one cannot hope to reach consensus, the 
proposed rules are put to a vote, with everyone having an equal right to vote. Even if some 
students do not agree with this method, and rather prefer their professor to set the class rules, 
they still have the right to engage in the discussion and vote. The professor has to provide the 
students, in advance, with a short list of unacceptable ways of treating each other—such as 
bullying, intimidating, demeaning, and so forth. So, he has the right to “declare out of order”144 
or “declare null and void”145 any rule that is in conflict with that list, or any rule or arrangement 
that would “seriously wrong members of the class,”146  but with no intention of policing the 
process. Moreover, the professor urges students to see the process as a moral engagement, which 
means that they should choose the rules that are “best for the class as a whole” and “treat 
everybody justly.”147 In order to also be epistemically entitled to their views, students should 
listen with open mind to the “significant objections”148 raised about them by their fellow 
classmates.  
Wolterstorff is giving the classroom example as an analogy that illustrates the role of 
citizens, the constitution, and government in his account of liberal democracy. If we put this 
example in the liberal context, it seems that citizens have the equal right to express whatever 
reason they have to support their preferred law, but they also have the moral duty to listen to 
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others open-mindedly as well as to avoid unjust laws and mistreating or wronging others. The 
constitution seems to be a short list that is introduced by the government in advance of citizens’ 
political deliberation and decision making (voting). As a result, the constitution has the power to 
exclude the laws that are passed by citizens’ vote, if those laws wrong some citizens or are unjust 
toward them. As Wolterstorff states, “the equal right to full political voice … [should] be 
exercised within constitutional limits on the powers of government and within legal limits on the 
infringement by citizens on the right of their fellow citizens to freely exercise their full political 
voice.”149 In this picture, although the government should not police the process of citizen’s 
political deliberation and voting, it apparently has the duty to call “out of order” those passed 
laws that wrong some citizens seriously or are not within the limits of the constitution.  
According to Wolterstorff, his equal voice account of liberal democracy is superior to 
Rawlsian public reason liberalism because it offers no restriction on the kinds of reasons citizens 
would use “other than that nobody is to bully anybody”150 and thus everybody is really respected 
as free and equal. In other words, he claims that there is no need for the public reason imperative 
in his account of liberal democracy because “everybody’s having the right to equal voice in the 
determination of the laws is sufficient to satisfy the commitment of liberal democracy to all 
citizens being respected as free and equal in setting the rules.”151 However, I will argue in this 
thesis that, in light of Wolterstorff’s later arguments in his 2013 paper, “Reply to Kevin 
Carnahan and Erik A. Anderson,” his account of liberal democracy in fact does not support what 
he claims to be a no-restraint position on religious reasons. But first I should lay out his main 
criticisms to Rawlsian public reason liberalism, which I will do in the following section. Doing 
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this will help show in more detail how Wolterstorff contradicts himself, and show other 
problems with his arguments. 
3.2: Wolterstorff’s criticisms of Rawls’s position  
Wolterstorff’s main criticisms of Rawls address “the thesis that the role of citizen in a 
liberal democracy includes a restraint on the use of reasons, derived from one's religion, for 
one's decisions and discussions on political issues, and a requirement that citizens instead use an 
independent source.”152 In this section, I will explain these criticisms in detail. 
As a philosopher who supports what he calls the Idea of liberal democracy,
153
 
Wolterstorff argues that public reason liberalism in all its versions, including Rawls’s political 
liberalism, is not compatible with the Idea of liberal democracy.
154
 He claims that assigning the 
Rawlsian duty of civility to religious citizens, requiring that they use public reason and refrain 
from using reasons grounded in their comprehensive doctrines in public political discussions, is 
in conflict with the components of the Idea of liberal democracy, specifically with the ideas of 
equality and of living one’s life as one sees fit. Wolterstorff acknowledges that the duty of 
civility is a moral (not a legal) duty; however, he believes that it still can have the social power to 
impose the nonliberal restraint of avoiding religious reasons in political deliberations.
155
 Even 
when briefly considering Rawls’s wide view of public reason156—introduced in Rawls’s later 
work in 1997, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, to revise his inclusive view—Wolterstorff 
does not seem to be convinced that it offers a less restrictive account of public reason liberalism. 
According to the wide view of public political culture, citizens and even legislators are always 
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allowed to give religious or other nonpublic reasons based on their reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines, with the proviso that they substitute these reasons with appropriate public reasons “in 
due course.”157 In fact, Wolterstorff believes that there is no need for “the public reason 
imperative”158 at all. It is giving citizens an equal voice, like in the classroom example, that 
results in treating them as free and equal and also setting rules that are fair to everyone.
159
 
Therefore, for him, the revised duty of civility in the wide view is still not compatible with the 
Idea of liberal democracy. According to Wolterstorff, aside from the three restraints on public 
deliberation that he offers in his consocial position (namely, the manner restraint, the constitution 
restraint, and the justice restraint), citizens should be able to “use whatever reasons they find 
appropriate” because there is “no reason to suppose that the ethic of the citizen in a liberal 
democracy includes a restraint on the use of religious reasons in deciding and discussing political 
issues.”160 In other words, liberal democracy does not require any restrictions on reasons citizens 
have in supporting a law or policy. 
Rawls’s public reason restraint is based on the idea that all reasonable citizens can agree 
on a set of freestanding principles of justice leading to a reasonable political conception of 
justice (like justice as fairness). According to Rawls, these principles can be derived from the 
ideas implicit in the shared public political culture of a democratic society. However, 
Wolterstorff believes that “such a basis is not necessary” because there exists liberal 
constitutional democratic societies thriving without such a shared basis.
161
 In such societies, 
citizens engage in political deliberation to reach an agreement on policies and laws rather than 
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start such deliberation with a pre-established agreement on some set of principles.
162
 Accepting 
Rawls’s burdens of judgment,163 Wolterstorff believes that we should not expect all reasonable 
citizens to agree on a shared political basis, in the same way that we should not expect them to 
endorse the same comprehensive doctrine. In his own words, “there is no more hope that 
reasonable and rational citizens will come to agreement, in the way Rawls recommends, on 
principles of justice, than that they will come to agreement, in the foreseeable future, on some 
comprehensive philosophical or religious doctrine.”164 In other words, living in a pluralistic 
society, we should know that we cannot hope to arrive at a “set of agreed-on principles.”165 
Trying to achieve such a shared and independent basis is “hopeless and misguided”; thus 
Wolterstorff suggests that instead, “we must learn to live with a politics of multiple 
communities.”166 In other words, when we want to support a law we should be able to use 
reasons that are grounded in the religious or nonreligious comprehensive views that we believe 
in.    
Wolterstorff argues that Rawls’s hope to derive freestanding political principles, which 
should be according to the Idea of liberal democracy and shared by all citizens, from the shared 
public political culture, is misguided. Therefore, requiring citizens to use independent principles 
of justice as the source
 
of their reasons on political matters, rather than allowing them to use their 
own religious comprehensive doctrines as the source of these reasons, is too idealistic. 
Wolterstorff maintains that the shared political culture does not exist in real democratic societies 
as Rawls suggests, and even if it exists, it is not necessarily the same as “the Idea of liberal 
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democracy.”167 In fact, many citizens of a liberal democratic society support positions that are in 
conflict with the Idea of liberal democracy itself.  
Here, it is worth noting that Wolterstorff seems to have an inaccurate understanding of 
what Rawls means by the shared public political culture of a democratic society. As mentioned 
in the second chapter, according to Rawls, the public political culture “comprises the political 
institutions of a constitutional regime and the public traditions of their interpretation (including 
those of the judiciary), as well as historic texts and documents that are common knowledge.”168 
However, Rawls also refers to the public political culture “as the shared fund of implicitly 
recognized basic ideas and principles” that citizens can use to formulate the freestanding political 
conceptions of justice.
169
 It seems that Wolterstorff’s understanding of the shared political 
culture is only based on the latter quote. But this incomplete understanding, if not an outright 
misunderstanding, of Rawls’s technical use of the public political culture, can be the result of the 
confusing terminology Rawls uses. As Charles Larmore points out, Rawls’s use of the term 
“public political culture,” with the specific meaning that he has in mind, can be misleading (even 
for Rawls himself) because it does not completely match with what the term itself suggests.
170
 
With the disparity between Wolterstorff’s understanding of “public political culture” and that of 
Rawls, I continue explaining Wolterstorff’s criticism of this concept. 
Wolterstorff tries to show that there is no shared political culture compatible with the 
Idea of liberal democracy in real liberal democratic societies; consequently, there is no shared 
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independent source
171—which seems to be Wolterstorff’s terminology for freestanding principles 
or political conceptions of justice—compatible with the Idea of liberal democracy. He gives the 
example of the current disputes in the United States (which is a liberal democratic country) over 
the issues like “the rights of practicing homosexuals” and “the legitimacy of prayers in public 
schools.”172 He points out that despite the conflicts within the political culture of the United 
States, and despite the fact that many Americans hold nonliberal views, the position implicit in 
Ideal of liberal democracy on these issues is quite clear: “homosexuals should enjoy equal 
freedom under law to live their lives as they see fit, and state sponsored schools should not 
include prayers as an official part of the school program.”173 Thus, the divergence between the 
shared political culture, within which many citizens hold nonliberal ideas, and the Idea of liberal 
democracy, makes it impossible to extract “from that political culture, principles of justice that 
are both shared and appropriate to a liberal democracy.”174  Wolterstorff points out that even 
Rawls himself sees his idea of public reason as an ideal, which means that in real life we are not 
able to find an independent source to base our reasons and political decisions on.
175
  
Although Wolterstorff is against “the religious-reason restraint,”176 he concedes that in 
certain kinds of societies, like seventeenth-century England, where people cared a lot about 
religion and had passion about it, it would be plausible to impose a moral restraint on using 
religious reasons in political deliberation. He believes this restraint to be valid because, in such 
societies, social peace “depend[s] on getting citizens to stop invoking God, canonical scriptures, 
                                                          
171
 Wolterstorff, “Role of Religion,” 100. 
172
 Wolterstorff, “Role of Religion,” 97. Woltestorff claims that, “on many issues a good many Americans 
are firmly opposed to the Idea of liberal democracy. The Idea of liberal democracy does not capture their 
‘considered convictions.’” Id. at 98. 
173
 Wolterstorff, “Role of Religion,” 97. 
174
 Wolterstorff, “Role of Religion,” 97. 
175
 Wolterstorff, “Role of Religion,” 101.  
176
 Wolterstorff, “Role of Religion,” 75. 
58 
 
and religious authorities when discussing politics in public.”177 Nevertheless, he does not see it to 
be the case for our century in Western societies, where religious tolerance is in the First 
Amendment of the United States constitution for example. Wolterstorff believes that in our 
current century we should rather be more wary of the secular causes people care deeply about. In 
fact, he argues that “pretty much anything that human beings care deeply about can be a menace 
to freedom—including, ironically, caring deeply about freedom.”178 If we look at recent history, 
for instance, secular ideas like “nationalisms of many sorts, communism, fascism, patriotisms of 
various kinds, economic hegemony” are responsible for human suffering.179 On the other hand, 
religion has been the cause of many positive social movements, like the abolitionist and the civil 
rights movements, in establishing liberal democracy.  
As mentioned in chapter two, Rawls not only recognizes the positive role of religious 
reasons in fulfilling the “Idea of liberal democracy,” he explicitly supports the use of such 
reasons in his inclusive view—according to which citizens should be able to give nonpublic 
reasons in their deliberations about fundamental political questions provided that political justice 
or the ideal of public reason is honoured. However, in his exclusive view—which only applies to 
the ideal well-ordered society with a firm overlapping consensus in which only public reason is 
accepted in political discussions on fundamental political issues—he excludes both religious and 
nonreligious philosophical views as comprehensive doctrines in favour of political conceptions 
of justice as the proper source of reason giving in public political debates. Wolterstorff sees 
Rawls’s even-handedness in considering both religious and secular comprehensive doctrines as 
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greatly meritorious;
180
 but he still asks, “What difference does it make what reasons citizens use 
in making their decisions and conducting their debates, if the positions they advocate do not 
violate the Idea of liberal democracy?”181  Wolterstorff understands the religious-reason restraint 
as an “epistemological restraint,”182 which is in conflict with the “Idea of liberal democracy.” 
What matters in a liberal democracy, according to him, is not the reasons citizens offer, but the 
compatibility between the law supported by citizens and the core ideas of liberal democracy. 
3.3: Responses to Wolterstorff’s positive project and his criticisms of Rawls 
In the previous section, I explained in detail Wolterstorff’s criticisms against the 
religious-reason restraint and the idea of an independent source. In this section, I will provide 
four main responses both to these criticisms and Wolterstorff’s positive account of liberal 
democracy, building on the work of Erik Anderson, Robert Audi, and William M. Curtis. 
a) Public reason is independent of both religious and secular reasons 
Although Wolterstorff acknowledges and admires Rawls’s even-handedness toward 
religious and secular comprehensive doctrines, he suspects that public reason liberalism is the 
result of “[f]ear of, or dislike for, religious reasons.”183 He believes that there should not be such 
a fear because anything that we passionately care about can work against our freedom, and so 
there is nothing specifically threatening about religion itself. But looking back at history, and 
even the contemporary context, where religion still oppresses its opponents, especially in 
theocratic governments, fear of religion seems plausible. Erik Anderson argues that we should 
not ignore “religion’s dark side,” which means the dogmatism, arrogance, and self-righteousness 
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that usually can be seen in religious people’s holding and defending social and political views—
which are mostly illiberal—based on what they take to be the absolute truth.184  
Wolterstorff himself seems to empathize with this dark aspect of religion when he 
mentions that in seventeenth-century England, for the sake of social peace, citizens had to stop 
using reasons that appeal to their religions. But he continues to say that, in the current century, 
secular ideas are more threatening because people have more passion for them.
185
  Robert Audi 
challenges this latter claim. He agrees with Wolterstorff that secular reasons can awaken great 
passion like religious reasons; however, he argues that the latter can still be more threatening 
because of its other aspects like assuming an “infallible authority” which many religious citizens 
are willing to uncritically and non-autonomously obey and follow.
186
  
However, Wolterstorff’s worry of excluding only religious reasons as nonpublic reasons 
does not address Rawls’s theory. Unlike Audi, for Rawls, both religious and secular reasons and 
beliefs are on the same footing as belonging to comprehensive doctrines that cannot bring social 
peace. As Rawls puts it, “secular philosophical doctrines do not provide public reasons” because 
they “belong to first philosophy and moral doctrine, and fall outside of the domain of the 
political.”187 Considering Rawls’s even-handedness in excluding both religious and secular 
comprehensive views from the political domain, if we want to have legitimate binding laws that 
can be justified to all reasonable citizens in a pluralistic society, why not listen to Rawls and 
substitute public reason for both religious and secular reasons when making binding political 
decisions? Wolterstoff answers that it is hopeless and misguided to look for an independent 
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source that people can appeal to when giving reasons in support of a policy. In other words, 
looking for public reasons which are generally understandable and acceptable to all reasonable 
people is hopeless and misguided. This idea leads to my second response to Wolterstorff, arguing 
that the shared “independent source” on which political decisions can be made is possible. 
b) Looking for shared freestanding political principles is not hopeless and misguided 
Wolterstorff criticizes Rawls’s political liberalism for expecting citizens with diverse 
standpoints to be “united on the principles they employ[ ] for deliberating and deciding on” laws 
and  policies while what real liberal democratic societies, like the United States, are concerned 
with is “convergence on a particular policy from ideologically diverse standpoints.”188 In other 
words, what citizens—or the majority of them—need is to reach agreement on a policy or a law, 
rather than on some shared political basis independent of all religions (or an independent source 
in Wolterstorffian terminology), in advance. Looking for such shared political principles is 
unrealistic and hopeless because “we cannot leap out of our perspectives. And even if we could, 
there is nothing firm that we could leap on to: no adequate independent source.”189  
But Wolterstorff’s special articulation of Rawls’s freestanding shared political basis—
namely, political conceptions of justice—as an independent source seems to be inaccurate. This 
articulation can lead to incorrectly assuming that there is no commonality between that shared 
political basis, on the one hand, and citizens’ religious and philosophical comprehensive 
doctrines, on the other. But, as noted in the second chapter, Rawls argues that we can expect to 
have a long-term stable liberal democracy for the right reasons only if our freestanding political 
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conceptions of justice can be supported by an overlapping consensus of all reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines, where being reasonable means not looking for an opportunity to gain 
the power to impose itself on citizens. In Rawls’s words, “political liberalism looks for a political 
conception of justice that we hope can gain the support of an overlapping consensus of 
reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines in a society regulated by it.”190 If there is 
such an overlapping consensus, citizens with different reasonable comprehensive views can 
support the same political conceptions of justice (and thus support public reason which is 
formulated by such conceptions) with their nonpublic reasons.  
Having an overlapping consensus on political principles seems to be unrealistic or 
unreliable for Wolterstorff. Although it is true that a firm overlapping consensus might never 
leave its idealistic status, I would like to suggest that citizens of a liberal democracy, like the 
Unites States or Canada, in fact share some political basis that is also supported by nonpublic 
reasons. Religious tolerance, equality of human beings, and rejecting slavery can be some 
examples of a shared political basis, which can also be supported by Christianity, Islam, 
Buddhism, and other reasonable comprehensive doctrines. As Audi also argues, although there is 
always disagreement on details, citizens in liberal democracies have consensus on matters like 
equal rights to freedom of religion and freedom of speech.
191
 He also adds that even Wolterstorff 
himself seems to have a political conception in mind that is independent of any religion: his third 
condition, namely, the justice restraint according to which political justice should be the goal of 
our political debates. Wolterstorff does not define political justice based on a certain religion; 
instead, he presents it as if it is understood and accepted by everyone, regardless of their 
worldviews. If justice can be a shared goal for all citizens, Audi continues, then one can 
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understand Wolterstorff as “implying that at least our main reasons for sociopolitical decisions 
(particularly concerning the legal structure of society) should be … presumably in some sense 
public.”192 Therefore, it would not be unrealistic to assume some shared political principles, 
which are not dependent on religions (or secular comprehensive doctrines), between citizens of a 
liberal democracy. 
Furthermore, Wolterstorff also assumes other shared principles, which are independent of 
religions, when he introduces the moral engagement requirement in his equal political voice 
account. He assumes that citizens should, among other things, treat each other justly, consider 
the common good, listen to each other with an open mind, accept the voting method, and not 
violate the constitution in their political debates, before casting their votes. Expecting citizens to 
hold these shared principles runs counter to his criticism of Rawls’s “model of shared general 
principles.”193 Since Wolterstorff is assuming pre-established agreement on moral premises 
himself while criticizing Rawls, one can argue that he is contradicting himself and thus his 
argument is not satisfying. For example, William Curtis defines Wolterstorff’s criticism of public 
reason liberalism as “simplistic” and “unsatisfying” because he is “implausibly assuming that 
there is unproblematic agreement on the framework of ‘the rights and liberties’ in which voting 
takes place.”194  This assumed “unproblematic agreement” can clearly be seen in Wolterstorff’s 
classroom example. All students are expected to accept the moral engagement requirement, the 
short list that the professor provides in advance to voting, and the authority of the professor to be 
able to declare a rule students have voted for as out of order. These assumed shared principles 
are apparently independent of religion and other comprehensive doctrines. Therefore, to argue 
                                                          
192
 Audi, “Wolterstorff on Religion,” 140. 
193
 Wolterstorff, Understanding Liberal Democracy, 172. 
194
 William M. Curtis, Defending Rorty: Pragmatism and Liberal Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 226. 
64 
 
that Rawls’s shared political basis for public reason is hopeless and misguided only by virtue of 
it being independent of religion (and other comprehensive doctrines) is in conflict with 
Wolterstorff’s own assumptions in his consocial account and equal political voice account. 
c) The duty of civility applies differently to government officials and citizens 
Charles Larmore makes a very useful distinction between what he calls “open discussion” 
and “decision making.” He defines these two different forms of political deliberation, 
respectively, as situations “where people argue with one another in the light of the whole truth as 
they see it” and “where they deliberate as participants in some organ of government about which 
option should be made legally binding.”195 When philosophers fail to draw such a distinction, 
they usually misunderstand Rawls as placing the public reason restraint (or the duty of civility) 
on all citizens with the same rigour, whenever they participate in public political deliberation. 
But I think Rawls draws a distinction quite similar to Larmore’s distinction when he 
distinguishes between “the background culture,” on the one hand, and “the public political 
culture of democratic society” or “the public political forum,” on the other. Rawls has been clear 
enough on this distinction, at least when, in “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” he points out 
that “the idea of public reason does not apply to all political discussions of fundamental 
questions, but only to discussions of those questions in what I [Rawls] refer to as the public 
political forum,”196 and that “[t]he idea of public reason does not apply to the background culture 
with its many forms of nonpublic reason.”197 For Rawls, the public political forum consists of 
judges, government officials, and candidates for public office, while the background culture is 
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“the culture of civil society… not, of course, guided by any one central idea or principle, whether 
political or religious.”198 The duty of civility for the first group is to explain by using public 
reason to citizens why they are supporting a certain law. However, in the case of the background 
culture, although the idea of public reason does not apply to it,
199
 the ideal duty of civility for 
citizens who belong to this group is to imagine how they would use public reason to support a 
law if they belonged to the first group—and by doing this, hold the officials and legislators 
accountable.
200
 Thus, the duty of civility only applies to the first group, or in its ideal form, 
applies to the first group “more strictly.”201  
Unlike Rawls, Wolterstoff fails to make a distinction, either explicitly or implicitly, 
between open discussion and decision making in his positive account of liberal democracy. In his 
classroom example, he apparently tries to draw an analogy between professor/students and 
government/citizens to show that Rawls’s idea of public reason is unnecessary (if not in conflict 
with the Idea of liberal democracy). Wolterstorff argues that in a democratic system, students 
(who seem to represent citizens) should have equal voice and thus be able to offer whatever 
reason they have in support of a rule. This situation looks similar to Larmore’s open discussion 
definition. Wolterstorff sees Rawls’s idea of public reason against his equal voice view because, 
based on his understanding of the idea of public reason, certain reasons, and as a result a number 
of students, are excluded from participating in deliberation. But, based on Rawls’s view, 
although citizens (who belong to the background culture) ideally have a moral duty of civility to 
be able to explain to others why they support a certain rule as if they were legislators, they are 
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not disallowed from offering their nonpublic reasons in public political deliberations; in fact, 
they can argue in support of or against a law “in the light of the whole truth as they see it.”202 It 
is the legislators (who belong to the public political forum) who have the more strict duty of 
using public reason when they are deciding on a binding law. What these people have to do looks 
similar to Larmore’s definition of decision making. However, in Wolterstorff’s example, the 
professor and his “short list” cannot be good analogies for the government (the public political 
forum) and the constitution in a liberal democracy.  
The classroom example is a faulty analogy because in democratic societies the 
government is not led, and the constitution is not established, only by one person (the professor) 
who is not a representative elected by voting. Moreover, students can in fact represent both the 
government legislators (who belong to Rawls’s public political forum) and citizens (who belong 
to Rawls’s background culture). Wolterstorff’s lack of distinction between open discussion and 
decision making has led him to misunderstand the degree to which the idea of public reason 
applies to government officials and ordinary citizens. Therefore, his criticisms of Rawls’s public 
reason and the duty of civility are at best imprecise, if not irrelevant.  
d) Wolterstorff’s “no religious-reason restraint” position restrains religious reasons   
In his classroom example, in which the professor tries to set the rules of his class 
democratically, Wolterstorff argues against the Rawlsian restraint on religious reasons in 
political deliberation. However, in his response to an example offered by Erik Anderson, 
Wolterstorff seems to have a different opinion; he approves of banning at least some religious 
reasons used by ordinary religious citizens when they want to vote in support of a law or policy.  
Anderson’s example is as follows: he asks us to imagine a faithful Christian citizen called 
Frank, who cares about politics and supports a law to prohibit the ritual of sacrificing animals 
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practiced by the followers of Santería. Frank’s reasoning is based on his most cherished religious 
belief according to which sacrificing animals is a sin to God. Anderson argues that “[t]his would 
be a clear case of one citizen proposing a law that would violate the religious freedom of 
others.”203 Now imagine another citizen who supports a law that prohibits this ritual based on the 
fact-checked and accepted reason that killing animals threatens public health and wellbeing. 
Although both reasons can result in the same law of banning the animal-killing ritual, according 
to Anderson, only the latter reason “would arguably be a legitimate exercise of state power, one 
that a citizen could reasonably advocate.”204  
With this example, Anderson tries to show two things. The first one is that the legitimacy 
of a proposed law is not independent from a reason that supports it. The law of banning the ritual 
would be the result of “a legitimate exercise of state power” if it is supported by the public health 
reason, but not so if it is supported by Frank’s religious reason. Therefore, Anderson’s example 
argues against Wolterstorff’s “‘no restraint on religious reasons’ position”205 according to which 
citizens should morally be allowed to support a coercive law solely based on their religious 
reason. Anderson believes that not all kinds of religious reasons can be acceptable as 
determining reasons for passing a coercive law. So he argues that Wolterstorff’s arguments 
would have been valid had he made a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable religious 
reasons.
206
 The second thing that Anderson tries to show with the Frank example is that passing a 
coercive law only based on our religious reason (Frank’s reason) to limit the religious exercise of 
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another religious group (the followers of Santería), would be a violation of “the religious 
freedom of all citizens.”207 This violation is something that Wolterstorff clearly disagrees with.    
In response to Anderson, in “Reply to Kevin Carnahan and Erik A. Anderson,” according 
to his equal voice account of liberal democracy, Wolterstorff argues that he agrees with 
Anderson and thus he calls Frank’s religious reason out of order. This is because it is not within 
the framework of the constitution; in this case, the United States’ First Amendment which 
protects citizens’ right to freedom of religion. Wolterstorff also points out, without going further 
into detail, that reasons like Frank’s reason, which appeal to his religion, are not compatible with 
having a moral engagement—which includes considering common good rather than self-interest, 
not bullying others, and listening to objections open-mindedly. He says, “Frank’s support for a 
law banning ritual animal sacrifice on the ground that it is an abomination to God is out of order 
in a liberal democracy—not just something that would be rejected by anyone who practices his 
citizenship as a moral engagement, but out of order.”208 It is not clear whether Wolterstorff wants 
to argue that all religious reasons similar to Frank’s (namely, reasons that solely appeal to God 
and holy books) should be rejected and considered as out of order in a liberal democracy. 
However, it seems to me that his argument for judging Frank’s reason as out of order is 
reminiscent of Rawls’s fact of reasonable pluralism and the duty of citizens to avoid using 
nonpublic reasons when they are participating in political decision making that will result in 
binding laws. This is evident from the following quote by Wolterstorff: 
 
The assumption behind the specification of this right [to freedom of religion in the First 
Amendment] is that in liberal democracies citizens disagree with each other on matters of 
religion … What the free exercise clause in the constitution implies is that citizens of a 
liberal democracy live with this reality: I affirm your civil right to the free exercise of 
your religion even though my religion tells me that yours is religiously objectionable. If, 
                                                          
207
 Erik A. Anderson, “A Comment on Wolterstorff and Eberle,” 418. 
208
 Wolterstorff, “Reply to Kevin Carnahan and Erik A. Anderson,” 434 (emphasis added). 
69 
 
on the contrary, I support the proposal to outlaw the practice of your religion on the 
ground that I find it religiously objectionable, I am asking the state to do what the free 
exercise clause forbids it to do. 
209
 
 
 
The above quote—which addresses the equal freedom of all citizens as well as the fact of 
reasonable pluralism—demonstrates the reason why Rawls had introduced the idea of pubic 
reason in the first place. So, Wolterstorff seems to say quite the same thing as Rawls. According 
to Rawls, we are exercising our legitimate political power when we (as legislators or as ordinary 
citizens who can ideally “think of themselves as if they were legislators”210) use public reason to 
explain our support for a coercive law to other citizens who follow different religious or secular 
doctrines. In other words, a binding law cannot be legitimate if it is not supported by public 
reasons, which are reasons all reasonable citizens can potentially understand and accept 
regardless of their religious or secular comprehensive views.  
Going back to Anderson’s example, it is true that the public health reason for banning the 
ritual of animal sacrifice, which can be understood as a public reason, does not violate the 
constitution of a liberal democracy. Hence, the law that is the result of this reason is a legitimate 
law. Although Wolterstorff is not optimistic that such a reason can be found,
211
 he agrees with 
Anderson—and I would say with Rawls—that it would be permissible (or “a legitimate exercise 
of state power” in Anderson’s and Rawls’s terminology) to support the law of banning the ritual 
animal sacrifice by using the public health reason but not by Frank’s religious reason. In other 
words, despite the fact that both reasons lead to the same result, that is, banning the followers of 
Santería from sacrificing animals, only the religious one is out of order in a liberal democracy. In 
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Wolterstorff’s words, “on my understanding of liberal democracy, Frank’s proposal to ban the 
ritual sacrifice of animals because he finds it religiously objectionable is out of order on 
constitutional grounds, whereas the proposal to outlaw all killing of animals on public health 
grounds is not out of order.”212 Therefore, the only difference between the two reasons seems to 
be the religious nature of Frank’s reason, which appeals to his God. This undermines 
Wolterstorff’s positive account of liberal democracy where he says, “[l]et citizens use whatever 
reasons they find appropriate—including, then, religious reasons.”213 
There are three problems with Wolterstorff’s argument against Frank’s reason. The first 
problem is that in the classroom example (in Wolterstorff’s positive account), it is the rules 
proposed that are out of order, never the reasons used to support rules. In that example, 
Wolterstorff argues that the professor can “declare out of order any proposed rule that he judges 
would be a serious affront to the worth or dignity of some member of the class,” and that 
“nothing is said as to the sorts of reasons members of the class should offer each other, other 
than that nobody is to bully anybody.”214 So, it seems that Wolterstorff is offering two different, 
incompatible arguments in the classroom example on the one hand and Anderson’s example, on 
the other. In Anderson’s example, Wolterstorff does not call the law banning the ritual animal 
sacrifice out of order. Surprisingly, he calls Frank’s religious reason, which supports that law, 
out of order. Since both Frank’s reason and the public health reason support the same law, the 
question of why only one of them is out of order is raised. As mentioned above, Wolterstorff 
argues that Frank’s reason “is out of order on constitutional grounds” because he regards the 
animal sacrificing ritual as “religiously objectionable.” This quote leads to the second and third 
problems with Wolterstorff’s calling Frank’s reason out of order.  
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The second problem is that Wolterstorff is not consistent in using the constitution 
restraint, according to which “the debates, except for extreme circumstances, are to be conducted 
and resolved in accord with the rules provided by the laws of the land and the provisions of the 
Constitution.”215 It is true that he says “[c]itizens in a liberal democracy are free to exercise their 
political voice with whatever aims, motivations, and reasons they prefer—provided that those 
fall within the constitutional and legal framework.”216 But, in other places, he argues in a way 
that implies he rejects any kind of restraint, even the constitution restraint, on reasons. For 
example, in the following quote, he even rejects the need for giving reasons altogether: 
 
the governing idea of liberal democracy says nothing at all about the sorts of reasons 
citizens are to give each other. Citizens are free to give each other whatever sort of 
reasons they wish. Not only are they free to do so; the governing idea of liberal 
democracy says nothing at all as to which sorts of reasons they ought to give each other, 
nothing even as to which sorts of reasons are to be preferred. The governing idea of 
liberal democracy doesn’t even tell citizens that they have to give some reason or other 
for deciding and voting as they do.
217
 
 
 
Based on the above quote, in a liberal democracy, it should not matter why citizens vote for a 
certain law. So, in Anderson’s example, it too should not matter what reason Frank uses as a 
citizen. He should be free to use his religious reason in voicing his support of a law. Therefore, 
by calling his religious reason out of order, Wolterstorff is contradicting his own understanding 
of the governing idea of liberal democracy.  
The third problem with Wolterstorff’s argument against Frank’s reason is also related to 
the fact that Wolterstorff calls this reason out of order on constitutional grounds for the reason 
that Frank sees the animal killing ritual objectionable based solely on his religion. On the one 
hand, in his positive account of liberal democracy, Wolterstorff never associates the constitution 
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restraint with religious reasons. On the contrary, Wolterstorff has always defended religious 
reasons against exclusion in public political deliberation. He is against public reason liberalism’s 
“restraint on religious reasons” because it “appears to be in flagrant conflict with the Idea of 
liberal democracy.”218 In fact, in his integrity objection to public reason liberalism (which will be 
explained in detail in the next section), Wolterstorff argues that asking religious citizens “not [to] 
base their decisions and discussions concerning political issues on their religion is to infringe, 
inequitably, on the free exercise of their religion.”219 On the other hand, Wolterstorff has never 
stated that a religious reason that appeals to God is unacceptable in liberal democracy—either on 
constitutional grounds or otherwise. In fact, he has never made a distinction between acceptable 
and unacceptable religious reasons. He considers “references to God, to Jesus Christ, to the 
Torah, to the Christian Bible, to the Koran”220 as examples of religious reasons in general.  And 
in his positive account of liberal democracy he argues against rejecting religious reasons 
(whether on a legal or a moral basis) from public political debates, as acceptable reasons in 
support of a law, on the basis that such rejection is against the idea of liberal democracy. 
In light of these two issues, it can be inferred that asking Frank not to base his vote in 
support of banning the animal sacrifice ritual on his religious reason (which appeals to God), 
would infringe on the free exercise of his religion, which is against the constitution. As a result, 
Wolterstorff cannot call Frank’s reason “out of order on the constitutional grounds” without 
undermining his own account of liberal democracy and his no-restraint position on religious 
reasons. In short, Wolterstorff is contradicting himself by declaring Frank’s religious reason as 
out of order.   
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3.4: Wolterstorff’s integrity objection and four responses to it 
In the previous section I showed the ways in which Wolterstorff’s position—including 
his positive account and criticisms of Rawls’s public reason liberalism—is self-contradictory. 
One final issue I want to address is Wolterstorff’s integrity objection (or as he calls it “the 
integralist objection”221), which seems to be seen by him as the final nail in public reason 
liberalism’s (and Rawls’s) coffin. This objection has attracted more attention than any other 
arguments of Wolterstorff against public reason liberalism and has been picked out by a few 
philosophers like Christopher J. Eberle, Cristina Lafont,
222
 and Jeffrey Stout,
223
 to argue against 
Rawls’s idea of public reason. Therefore, it is deserving of its own section and requires a 
response. 
The integrity objection mainly addresses what Wolterstorff sees as a violation of religious 
citizens’ integrity and freedom. According to this view, it is not an option for religious citizens to 
simply put away their fundamental beliefs while participating in political deliberation and use 
public reason instead. Wolterstorff states, “[m]ost people who reason[ ] from their religion in 
making up their mind on political issues would lack the intellectual imagination required for 
reasoning to the same position from premises derived from the independent source.”224 And even 
if they can use public reason, it would not be realistic to ask them to think in religious reasons 
but speak in public reasons. Moreover, expecting religious citizens to give priority to public 
reason over their own religious reasons, especially in cases where they contradict each other, is 
unrealistic. Thus, according to this view, the idea of public reason limits religious citizens’ 
ability to apply their own cherished beliefs and values to their public lives, which results in 
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dividing their lives into public and private realms. This places a psychological burden on 
religious citizens, preventing them from living integrated lives and living their lives as they see 
fit. As Wolterstorff famously puts it: 
 
It belongs to the religious convictions of a good many religious people in our society that 
they ought to base their decisions concerning fundamental issues of justice on their 
religious convictions. They do not view it as an option whether or not to do so. It is their 
conviction that they ought to strive for wholeness, integrity, integration, in their lives: 
that they ought to allow the Word of God, the teachings of the Torah, the command and 
example of Jesus, or whatever, to shape their existence as a whole, including, then, their 
social and political existence. Their religion is not, for them, about something other than 
their social and political existence; it is also about their social and political existence.
225
 
 
According to Wolterstorff, prohibiting religious citizens from giving reasons based on what they 
believe contradicts the very principle of freedom in the Idea of liberal democracy, which claims 
to give religious citizens the right to exercise their religions. Since it is not in any way natural for 
religious people to divide their lives into a private, religious part and a public, nonreligious part, 
the prohibition of religious reasons is tantamount to silencing them in public political 
deliberations. Christopher J. Eberle, another Christian philosopher, agrees with Wolterstorff and 
argues that religious people are required by their religions to fulfill certain obligations and 
duties—for example, they have to obey God— “irrespective of their feelings, desires, or 
thoughts about those obligations”;226 thus, when there is a conflict between their duties as 
religious people and their duties as citizens, they have to favor the former over the latter at all 
times.  
Another philosopher that should be mentioned here, who agrees with Wolterstorff’s 
integrity objection to Rawls’s political liberalism, is Cristina Lafont. Although she disagrees with 
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abandoning the idea of public reason, she argues against Rawls’s wide view, which allows 
offering religious reasons with the proviso that in due course they are accompanied by suitable 
public reasons. She contends that since religious citizens unavoidably give priority to their 
religious reasons, “the political integration of religious citizens in liberal democracies” is 
threatened when they are asked to also offer public reason.
227
 In other words, Rawlsian 
liberalism restrains religious citizens’ participation—if not completely excluding them from 
political deliberations—or at least their sincere participation, in political deliberations.228  
 In his later works, Wolterstorff recognizes that religion can play different roles in 
different religious people’s lives. For one group, which does not practice their religion regularly, 
religion is just a set of beliefs while for another group it shapes every aspect of their lives. The 
majority of religious people are somewhere on a spectrum between these two groups. 
Wolterstorff makes these distinctions to modify his view and clarify that the integrity objection is 
only about the second group of religious people; the religious integralists. He says, “a good deal 
of what I have said about the use of religious reasons in public political discourse makes sense 
only if I am understood as having in mind especially those for whom their religion is a form of 
life.”229 He gives the example of two reasonable religious citizens, the barthian and the 
eberlian—the second of which is obviously borrowed from Eberle—who see their religion as a 
way of life they are committed to live. Although both of them see “citizens as free and equal” 
and “society as a fair system of cooperation,”230 their religious commitments always override all 
other commitments.  
                                                          
227
 Lafont, “Religion and the Public Sphere,” 131. 
228
 In this work, I will not go into more details of Eberle and Lafont’s ideas because they have developed 
their own positive accounts, which is not possible to explore in addition to Wolterstorff’s account in this 
limited space. 
229
 Wolterstorff, “Reply to Kevin Carnahan and Erik A. Anderson,” 430. 
230
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 15. 
76 
 
Both the barthian and the eberlian are entitled to their convictions because they have the 
habit of openly listening to objections, but they have not been convinced to change their 
convictions so far. The difference between them is that the barthian sees himself obligated to use 
only religious reasons when dealing with political issues, whereas the eberlian sees himself as 
being allowed to also use public reason. In other words, for the barthian “a component in his 
comprehensive religious doctrine is that he use the resources of his comprehensive doctrine and 
only those resources in deliberating, debating, and voting on some political issues,”231 whereas 
the eberlian “does not think he is being unfaithful in also thinking about political issues using the 
resources of public reason.”232 The eberlian’s two resources do not always match; sometimes he 
cannot find a parallel public reason that can support the same policy. In these cases, he always 
gives priority to his religious conviction because he has the duty to be faithful to his religion. 
Wolterstorff’s example of such a conflicting case between resources is when the eberlian “is 
obligated to God to be a pacifist, to defend the pacifist position, and to vote for the pacifist 
option whenever the occasion arises.”233 All public reason—derived from political conceptions 
of justice—he can find are not in favour of pacifism, but he fulfills his duty to God and keeps 
defending pacifism. 
The barthian and the eberlian, according to Wolterstorff’s interpretation of public reason 
liberalism, are not to blame for disregarding public reason or favouring religious reason over 
public reason, respectively. This is because, according to his understanding of public reason 
liberalism, Wolterstorff claims that “the public reason imperative” is only “a prima facie 
obligation” that can be outweighed by “other prima facie obligations” incompatible with it.234  In 
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other words, the religious integralists are always allowed to give priority to their religious 
obligations over the public reason imperative. Therefore, Wolterstorff tries to show that the 
existence of the religious integralists—like the barthian and the eberlian—do not allow public 
reason liberalism to define the ethic of the citizen in a liberal democracy as any of the following: 
(1) one should not use religious reasons in support of a political position; (2) one can only do so 
when one also agrees to use public reason; (3) one can only do so when one also agrees to use 
public reason and can find a proper such public reason.
235
  
Having explained the integrity objection, I have four responses to it. I start with analyzing 
whether the three points above actually address Rawls’s idea of public reason.   
a) The existence of religious integralists can only question Rawls’s exclusive view 
The three points above might seem similar to Rawls’s moral duty of civility. However, 
here I want to show that they only address the duty of civility in Rawls’s ideal view, that is, the 
exclusive view, but not in his inclusive view or wide view of public political culture.  
Wolterstorff’s first point, according to which religious reasons are not allowed in political 
deliberation, can be related to the exclusive view. Based on this view, when society is well-
ordered and has a solid overlapping consensus, citizens have the duty to use only public reason. 
It is worth repeating that Rawls is aware that this is an idealistic view and does not apply to real 
societies like the United States and Canada. The second point, according to which one can only 
use religious reason when one also agrees to use public reason, can roughly be related to the 
wide view of public political culture. This view allows religious citizens to give their own 
religious reasons at any time in political deliberations with the proviso that those reasons be 
substituted by public reason in due course. However, Wolterstorff might have misunderstood the 
wide view—in case he has had it in mind—because Rawls does not put a limit as to when 
                                                          
235
 Wolterstorff, Understanding Liberal Democracy, 102, 103. 
78 
 
religious reasons should be substituted by public reason and who is obliged to carry out the 
substitution. For him, these are things that should be developed in practice and so cannot be 
specified in advance.
236
 Therefore, the proviso can be satisfied by someone other than the 
religious person who uses public reason and the religious person who has offered the religious 
reason does not have to necessarily agree to also offer a public reason. The third point, according 
to which one can only use religious reason when one also agrees to use public reason and can 
find a proper such public reason, can only be related to the wide view, but it also assumes 
something that Rawls never says in the wide view: Rawls has not specified that it is the religious 
person himself who has to find proper public reasons. So it can be the case that someone other 
than the religious person, who has offered a religious reason, finds the parallel public reason and 
fulfills the due course proviso.  
Therefore, one can see that none of the three mentioned points is capturing, or capturing 
precisely enough, Rawls’s moral duty of civility for real liberal democracies. As a result, the 
presence of the religious integralists—even if they are reasonable as Wolterstorff claims—cannot 
discredit Rawls’s duty of civility as the ethic of the citizen of a real liberal democracy. 
b) The integrity objection is against the impartiality of the state towards different 
comprehensive doctrines 
To respond to the integrity objection from another angle, one could start by asking 
whether it is realistic to expect absolute religious (or secular)
237
 integrity in a liberal democracy, 
which is marked by the fact of reasonable pluralism. If we understand integrity as Wolterstorff 
suggests, one should always be able to give priority to one’s religious obligations over other 
obligations. However, Wolterstorff agrees that citizens’ conceptions of the good life “flagrantly 
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contradict each other”238 in many respects and thus, in a pluralistic liberal democracy, 
government neutrality (impartiality) is essential. Now one could ask what could happen if the 
religious integralists hold or seek office in government and engage in political decision making 
in the “public political forum,” to use Rawls’s term. As Wolterstorff argues, these sorts of 
religious citizens could “lack the intellectual imagination”239 to use public reason, see themselves 
obligated to only use their own religious reasons (the barthian), or always give priority to their 
religious reasons if they see a conflict between them and public reason (the eberlian). Since these 
religious integralists are reasonable, they cannot be prevented from working as officials and 
legislators. But can they secure the neutrality of government? It seems unlikely, because in order 
to be impartial they should be able to consider reasons other than their own religious reasons as 
unbiasedly as possible. To decide on a law or a policy that affects all citizens, they need to 
consider the common good
240
 rather than their obligation to be faithful to God.
241
 This means 
that if their obligation to God conflicts with the common good, they should not give priority to 
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the former. In addition, even if their religious reasons do not result in a policy that conflicts with 
the common good, they should still be open to other nonpublic or public reasons that might result 
in a policy that serves the common good better. If they keep giving priority to their own religious 
reasons (the eberlian), or not even consider supporting a policy that is not the result of a religious 
reason they endorse (the barthian), they are not neutral (impartial) between their religion on the 
one hand and other religious and secular comprehensive doctrines, on the other. 
Even as ordinary citizens—who can vote and hold the officials and legislators 
accountable—the religious integralists might need to consider other reasons (especially public 
reasons) in support of political positions. This is because, according to Wolterstorff’s justice 
restraint and moral engagement requirement, their goal should be political justice and serving the 
common good rather than simply the interest of the religious group they are affiliated with; to 
have such a goal one might need a more open perspective than just one’s comprehensive 
doctrine. In fact, Rawls’s concept of reasonableness is an attempt to reach such an open 
perspective that honours reciprocity, which makes pluralistic liberal democracy possible. It is not 
clear though how the religious integralists—whether as legislators or ordinary citizens—
understand society as a fair system of cooperation, as Wolterstorff claims.  
In Rawls’s political liberalism, reasonable citizens should propose fair terms of 
cooperation based on a political conception of justice that they find the most reasonable. They 
“must also think it at least reasonable for others to accept them [namely, the proposed fair terms 
of cooperation], as free and equal citizens.”242 But the religious integralists only (the barthian) or 
firstly (the eberlian) allow their religion to shape their political views rather than a political 
conception of justice. They do not also think whether what they offer can be acceptable to others 
or not. In fact, what they are willing to do is “to offer their reasons for the policies they favor and 
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to listen to criticisms of those reasons, just as they are willing to offer criticisms of other people’s 
reasons.”243 Wolterstorff maintains that this means that “they are reasonable.”244 But this is not 
convincing. To support his claim that these citizens do not “suffer from Rawlsian 
unreasonableness,”245 Wolterstorff has the burden to provide more details to clarify how these 
citizens offer and accept fair terms of cooperation. Without doing this, he fails to confidently call 
these citizens reasonable in the Rawlsian sense and conclude that their presence in a liberal 
democracy makes Rawls’s moral duty of civility unacceptable as the ethic of the citizen in such a 
society.  
c) Complete integrity is not realistic 
Another point that can be made against the integrity objection is that, as much as it is not 
possible to step out of one’s perspective completely, it is not also possible to have complete 
integrity like the barthian and the eberlian. This is why some, like Olivia Newman, believe that 
Wolterstorff’s religious integralist example “exaggerates our ability to achieve integration and 
underestimates the value of maintaining some differentiation of character and diversity of 
commitments.”246 In fact, in order to be able to live in a pluralistic liberal democracy, citizens 
should be able to adopt more than only one perspective,
 247
 including a more open perspective of 
the common good, as was mentioned above. For example, such citizens should have the ability to 
listen with an open mind to others, which seems to require one to allow her mind to change. But 
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in the case of the religious integralists, their mind is so fixed on their number one obligation, 
namely, being faithful to their religion or God, that one doubts whether they can ever listen 
openly. This is another point that Wolterstorff has not clarified when he claims that the barthian 
and the eberlian are entitled to their convictions because they have listened to criticisms 
“carefully and with open mind.”248 He needs to show how being a religious integralist as he 
characterizes it is compatible with listening open-mindedly. Most importantly, he needs to show 
that such integralist characters, who are also willing to listen openly to different views, can 
actually exist. Without doing this, his argument in the integrity objection, which is against the 
need for the idea of public reason, is invalid. 
d) The integrity objection contradicts another argument Wolterstorff offers 
My next response to the integrity objection is based on what I call Wolterstorff’s “many 
reasons” argument. In one of his arguments against the idea of public reason, he draws a 
distinction between our own reason for supporting a policy and the reason we would use in 
public discussions to support the same policy. Wolterstorff believes, if there is no misleading 
involved, “there is an eminently honorable reason for [such a] discrepancy between”249 these two 
reasons; the reason for such a discrepancy is trying to convince others to support the same 
policy. Since everyone is usually convinced by a different reason, public reason seems 
unnecessary. To support this argument against the need for public reason, Wolterstorff offers the 
following example: if there are two people, Ryan and Wendy, one does not have to support a 
policy based on a reason that Ryan, Wendy, and others accept. Instead, one can have her own 
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reason, offer a reason to Ryan that she knows he might accept, and offer another reason to 
Wendy that she knows she might accept.
250
 Wolterstorff continues: 
 
In a democracy, we discuss and debate, with the aim of reaching agreement. We do not 
just mount the platform to tell our fellow citizens how we see things. We listen and try to 
persuade. Typically our attempts at persuasion are on an ad hoc basis: offering to 
Republicans reasons that we think might appeal to them, if we can find such, to 
Democrats reasons that we think might appeal to them, if we can find such, to Christians 
reasons that we think might appeal to them, if we can find such, to America-firsters 
reasons that we think might appeal to them, if we can find such. And so forth.
251
 
 
Thus, Wolterstorff does not see any problem with using as many different reasons as one can use 
to convince other citizens to support a policy one advocates. This seems to be the strongest 
response one can make to the integrity objection: using reasons other than the reason one 
sincerely and deeply believes (whether they are based on an independent source or not) does not 
have to threaten one’s integrity. Wolterstorff clearly states that reasons offered to others “need 
not even be reasons that I accept—let alone reasons that for me personally were 
determinative.”252 It can be inferred from this that religious citizens can have their own religious 
reasons in support of a policy while also offering different reasons that they know can convince 
others without risking their own integrity. Thus, by accepting the “fact of honorable 
discrepancy” 253 as Wolterstorff suggests, between the reasons one has in mind and the reasons 
one offers in public, religious citizens’ sincere participation will not be at risk, as Lafont claims, 
if they are asked to also offer public reason. In other words, offering public reason in addition to 
their religious reasons does not place a psychological burden on religious citizens; they can 
exercise their religions freely and live their lives as they see fit.  
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So Wolterstorff contradicts his integrity objection by offering his “many reasons” 
argument. Moreover, the integrity objection not only draws an unrealistic picture of reasonable 
citizens who seek complete integrity to their religion in a pluralistic liberal democracy, it does 
not address Rawls’s inclusive and wide views. Therefore, it is not successful as an objection 
against Rawls’s idea of public reason in real liberal democracies. 
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Chapter 4: Public Reason or No Public Reason? 
 
As mentioned in the second chapter, Rawls introduces the idea of public reason to make 
social unity and peace possible in a liberal democratic society consisting of a plurality of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. He believes that government neutrality (the separation of   
church and state) is necessary to protect religions, secular culture, and the state from each other 
equally.
254
 We need a family of freestanding political conceptions of justice—although they are 
independent of all comprehensive doctrines, political conceptions of justice act as a module in 
them when they are reasonable—as a shared political basis that makes such neutrality toward 
comprehensive doctrines, and thus social unity and peace, possible. Political decisions, including 
laws and policies that are binding to all citizens, are legitimate only when they are the result of a 
political deliberation (and voting in cases of stand-offs
255
) in which citizens ground their reasons 
in political conceptions of justice, rather than their religious or secular comprehensive views, in 
support of such decisions.    
In the third chapter, I explained that, although Wolterstorff also agrees with government 
neutrality
256
 and the fact of pluralism, he criticizes Rawls for assuming a shared political basis 
independent of comprehensive doctrines and imposing a moral duty on citizens to avoid offering 
religious reasons in their political deliberation. Wolterstorff indicates that voting is what makes a 
binding law legitimate in a liberal democracy, not the sort of reason that citizens use. However, 
he later calls Frank’s religious reason—as a reason determining a binding law against the 
followers of another religion incompatible with Frank’s religion—out of order by virtue of it 
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being an appeal to God, while he accepts another reason, which addresses public well-being, in 
support of the same law. As was mentioned in section 3.3, this position contradicts 
Wolterstorff’s view against Rawls’s moral restraint on religious reasons. 
To be fair to Wolterstorff’s concern with regard to the religious reason restraint position, 
I would like to argue that if citizens are engaged in political debates that do not have the direct 
goal of passing or enforcing a law or a policy, Wolterstorff is right to oppose any restraints on 
religious reasons and to see such restraints as a violation of the freedom of speech. Even in cases 
of political decision making—implemented through legislation or voting by citizen voters or 
officials, judges, and legislators—I agree with Wolterstorff that everyone should be able to 
express their reasons based on their comprehensive doctrines, or it would again be against 
freedom of speech. Even Rawls is cautious not to overstep this freedom when he emphasizes that 
the duty of civility “is not a legal duty, for in that case it would be incompatible with freedom of 
speech.”257 Characterizing the duty of civility as moral, however, is also not exempt from 
Wolterstorff’s criticism, because he sees “social disapproval”258 as a power that can enforce such 
a duty. One could agree that moral duties as well as norms in a society can sometimes have a 
social power that is comparable with the power of legalization and criminalization. But it does 
not mean that it is always the case or that we should not introduce any moral duties for ourselves 
as citizens. Wolterstorff himself, contrary to his criticisms of moral duties, assumes such duties 
in his account of liberal democracy when he speaks of moral engagement and epistemological 
entitlement. Thus, there seems to be more similarities in Rawls and Wolterstorff’s theories than 
Wolterstorff might be aware of. 
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Both Wolterstorff and Rawls are the proponents of constitutional liberal democracy as 
well as the neutrality of the state towards all comprehensive doctrines. They emphasize the 
necessity of political engagement within the limits of a just constitution of a pluralistic liberal 
democracy, which includes religious toleration and the right to free exercise of religion. From 
both Rawls’s and Wolterstorff’s perspectives, for example, Frank’s religious reason in support of 
a binding law against the ritual of Santería religion is not acceptable because it appeals to a 
certain religion’s God, whereas a reason that appeals to public well-being is acceptable. To use 
Rawls’s language, Frank’s reason is a nonpublic reason based on his cherished comprehensive 
doctrine, while the public health reason is a public reason that can be endorsed by all reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. A binding law or policy passed or enforced by the first reason is not 
legitimate because it is not based on a shared political basis. However, a law is legitimate if it is 
passed or enforced based on the second reason, which is a generally understandable and 
acceptable reason. For Wolterstorff, Frank’s reason is out of order because it violates the First 
Amendment, and thus interferes with the free exercise of Santería religion. I believe that 
Wolterstorff’s argument against Frank’s reason is similar to Rawls’s argument because the First 
Amendment can be understood as a shared and independent political basis. More specifically, the 
First Amendment can be understood, in the Rawlsian sense, as a constitutional essential “which 
all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and 
ideals acceptable to their common human reason.”259 Based on the Frank example, I would like 
to suggest that, despite what Wolterstorff claims, he, like Rawls, supports the same idea of 
restraining religious reasons when it comes to accepting them as the determinant for passing or 
enforcing a binding law or policy.  
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Wolterstorff clearly contradicts himself when he rejects any restraints on the sorts of 
reasons that citizens offer, on the one hand, to advocate religious citizens’ right to freedom of 
speech, and calls Frank’s religious reason out of order to protect the First Amendment, on the 
other. His integrity objection is also toothless as it contradicts with his “many reasons” argument, 
according to which reasonable citizens may plausibly use as many reasons to convince different 
people to agree with a law or policy that they support. Surprisingly, here he does not see using 
different reasons as a violation to citizens’ integrity, but believes that Rawls’s moral duty of 
civility, which in the wide view asks citizens to use public reason in addition to their religious 
reasons, can violate the integrity of citizens like the barthian—who is strangely both reasonable 
and sees himself committed to only use religious reasons in his political deliberations. 
Furthermore, since Wolterstorff does not make a distinction between Rawls’s different views of 
public reason, he also fails to reject the idea of public reason and citizens’ moral duty to use 
public reason—in Rawls’s inclusive and wide views—with his integrity objection. 
Among Rawls’s views on the role of reasons in political decision making, which are the 
exclusive and inclusive views introduced in Political Liberalism and the wide view of public 
political culture introduced in “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, I would like to argue that 
the latter is the most plausible, both theoretically and practically. The exclusive view, according 
to which all citizens should offer only public reason in all political debates, belongs to the realm 
of ideal theory. This view is about a well-ordered society with maximum stability. Rawls 
explains this view as follows: “on fundamental political matters, reasons given explicitly in terms 
of comprehensive doctrines are never to be introduced into public reason.”260 Since this view is 
only about an ideal liberal democracy, I would disregard it as a viable solution for the problem of 
legitimacy in real pluralistic liberal democracies. Rawls himself is also aware that the exclusive 
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view does not apply to real societies, but he believes that we need such an ideal to help us 
navigate our real societies towards the ideal of public reason. As I mentioned in the second 
chapter, my focus in this work is not on Rawls’s and Wolterstorff’s methodology. Moreover, 
Rawls is not only concerned with the ideal society as he also introduces his inclusive view.  
In the inclusive view, Rawls mentions the abolitionists’ and Martin Luther King’s 
religious reasons against slavery as examples of acceptable reasons that “strengthen the ideal of 
public reason.”261 Although this view clearly allows for religious reasons to be offered on 
fundamental political issues, I would like to suggest that it is still restrictive considering the 
proviso of strengthening the ideal of public reason; it could be the case that citizens do not 
recognize whether a religious (or secular) reason is strengthening the ideal of public reason or 
not. In fact, the ideal of public reason does not seem to be an uncontroversial and definite 
conception that can always specify in advance whether a nonpublic reason is in its favour or not. 
Since the challenge of assessing nonpublic reasons in the face of the ideal of public reason is not 
present in Rawls’s wide view, I argue that Rawls’s wide view is more feasible as a view that is in 
accordance with liberalism and freedom of speech.   
According to the wide view, religious (and secular) reasons are not only allowed to “be 
introduced in public political discussion at any time” with the in due course proviso, there “may 
be positive reasons for introducing” such reasons in the public sphere.262 To explain the first part, 
citizens in public political culture who are responsible for making political decisions even on 
fundamental political issues do not face any restrictions on expressing whatever reason they 
have, but “proper political reasons”263 must also be introduced in support of the same law or 
policy to make it legitimate. This obligation to introduce proper political reasons (or public 
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reasons) in due course is what Rawls calls the proviso. According to this proviso, religious (or 
secular) reasons are not sufficient to support a law or a policy. Rawls illustrates this point (and 
also the next point) in the following example: “citizens of faith who cite the Gospel parable of 
the Good Samaritan do not stop there, but go on to give a public justification for this parable's 
conclusions in terms of political values. In this way citizens who hold different doctrines are 
reassured, and this strengthens the ties of civic friendship.”264 To explain the second part of the 
wide view, it can even be a good thing if citizens introduce their religious (and secular) reasons 
as long as they accept the proviso. This is because, by embracing the proviso, religious (and 
secular) citizens’ “commitment to constitutional democracy is publicly manifested” and thus 
they “are more willing to honor the duty of civility.”265 When citizens are aware of each other’s 
such commitments, they can introduce their comprehensive doctrines without violating the ideal 
of public reason. Rawls mentions the abolitionists’ and Martin Luther King’s religious reasons as 
examples that strengthened the ideal of public reason because they had manifested their support 
for constitutional democracy as the result of fulfilling the proviso.
266
 Although Rawls does not 
explain how they have fulfilled the proviso, he points out in a footnote, “I do not know whether 
the Abolitionists and King thought of themselves as fulfilling the purpose of the proviso. But 
whether they did or not, they could have. And had they known and accepted the idea of public 
reason, they would have.”267 
Rawls’s wide view of public political culture, I argue, is the most plausible view among 
Rawls’s other two views and Wolterstorff’s view for three reasons. Firstly, the wide view 
removes the restriction on offering religious (or secular) reasons—whether they are good reasons 
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or not—in political debates and thus honours the right to freedom of speech. However, it also 
recognizes that such reasons are not sufficient to support a law or a policy, and proper public 
reasons are also required. For example, in Frank’s case, he can offer his religious reason (which 
appeals to God), but this reason is not by itself sufficient to pass a law that bans the followers of 
Santería from their animal sacrificing ritual; a proper public reason is required to pass such a 
law. Secondly, it does not determine who should fulfill the proviso and when it should be done. 
Rawls rightly notes that these matters cannot satisfyingly be determined in advance, for they 
“must be worked out in practice” by the public political culture of the time.268 Thus, as an 
example, it is not necessarily and only the duty of the eberlian integralist to find a proper public 
reason to support a law that is the result of his religious conviction; somebody else might want 
and be able to do that. Thirdly, the wide view makes a clear distinction between the duty of 
civility of citizens in the public political culture (or the public political forum) and the 
background culture. In a representative democracy, citizens who belong to the latter culture, 
according to Rawls, usually do not have to vote to make political decisions on fundamental 
political issues. They elect the government officials and legislators to decide on such matters 
instead. Thus, even if citizens ideally want to fulfill the proviso and so hold the officials and 
legislators accountable, the moral duty does not apply to them.
269
 Thus, according to Rawls’s 
wide view, the idea of public reason does not apply to examples like Frank and the integralists, 
who belong to the background culture and are only engaged in the open discussion form of 
public debate.  
I conclude this chapter by pointing out that Wolterstorff fails to offer a better—
consistent, and more liberal and fair—alternative account of liberal democracy in which there is 
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no need for any kind of restraint on religious reasons. His account is not consistent because in his 
positive accounts—the consocial and equal voice positions—Wolterstorff assumes freestanding 
shared principles, such as political justice and moral engagement, while criticizing Rawls for 
introducing political conceptions of justice as freestanding shared principles. He contradicts his 
no-restraint position on religious reasons when he responds to Anderson’s example of a devout 
Christian, Frank, who appeals to God in support of a law banning the followers of Santería from 
their ritual. He calls Frank’s reason out of order, which also challenges his claim to have offered 
a more liberal and fair account of liberal democracy. Moreover, his integrity objection to public 
reason liberalism contradicts his many reasons argument, which shows that using different 
reasons in support of the same law or policy does not undermine the integrity of a person. This 
objection also fails to address Rawls’s wide view of public political culture, which would not put 
pressure on ordinary citizens like the integralists to supplement their religious reasons with 
proper public reasons themselves. In addition to all this, Wolterstorff also misrepresents Rawls’s 
public reason liberalism by ignoring both his inclusive and wide views on the one hand, and his 
distinction between the background culture and the public political culture, on the other hand. 
This misrepresentation makes his own positive account as well as his criticisms of Rawls less 
credible.  
I want to end this thesis by arguing that in the Rawls-Wolterstorff debate on the role of 
reasons in public political deliberation—in its decision-making sense—Wolterstorff fails to show 
that without the idea of public reason, there can be a better way to maintain the neutrality of the 
state, and thus social peace and stability, in a pluralistic democratic society. On the contrary, 
Rawls’s wide view of public political culture offers a more realistic solution to having a neutral 
93 
 
government capable of passing legitimate binding laws in a pluralistic democratic society, in 
which reasonable citizens hope to find a common political ground. 
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